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TRUMP’S “BIG-LEAGUE” TAX REFORM:
ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF
CORPORATE TAX CHANGES
Ryan J. Clements*
This Article reviews and assesses corporate tax reforms advocated by
President Donald Trump during his presidential campaign and signed into
law since taking office (the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017), in light of
economic theory and the Modigliani-Miller Irrelevance Theorem.  The Ar-
ticle argues that companies will adapt polcies in light of new taxation mea-
sures, thereby impacting the effectiveness of reform.  In support of this
conclusion, the Article surveys two empirical studies—one in relation to the
repatriation efforts of President Bush’s Homeland Investment Act and an-
other in relation to unexpected changes to the taxation of Canadian income
trusts—to highlight how reform measures can lead to unanticipated results.
The Article then applies the principles of these studies, the general eco-
nomic theories, and the Modigliani-Miller Irrelevance Theorem to cast un-
certainty on the net effect of Trump’s tax reforms.  Next, the Article reviews
the constitutionality of a “border adjustment tax.” This tax was proposed
during the election campaign, but was ultimately jettisoned in the final tax
reform bill.  Specifically, it analyzes whether such a policy is constitutional
or whether it is an unconstitutional direct tax, not apportioned between the
States that does not qualify as income under the Sixteenth Amendment.
The Article shows that such a constitutional challenge is a difficult under-
taking given the substantive arguments in favor of constitutionality, the rar-
ity of judicial intervention in overturning tax laws, and the wide discretion
of Congress to levy taxes on income.  Finally, the Article concludes by con-
sidering the role of economic analysis on constitutional challenges to tax
legislation and provides an overview of the arguments, both for and
against, utilizing economic analysis in this regard.  The conclusion includes
a review of the various cases and defining principles (emphasizing the deci-
sions of Judge Richard Posner) where economic analysis has been used in
the statutory interpretation of tax laws.
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INTRODUCTION
President Donald Trump’s campaign promise that he would usher in
“big-league”1 changes to tax laws came to fruition with the December
2017 passing of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, which included, among
other things: rate cuts; deduction and bracket eliminations (including limi-
tations on the corporate deductibility of interest); a “one-time” repatria-
tion tax on corporate profits held abroad; eliminating the alternative
minimum tax (“AMT”); changing capital expense rules, and adopting a
business “territorial tax system.”2  Despite campaigning on a promise to
institute a “border adjustment tax” (“BAT”) (that would have favored do-
1. See Matthew Rocco, Trump Says ‘Big-League’ Tax Reform Details Coming in
Week, FOX BUS. (Feb. 9, 2017), http://www.foxbusiness.com/politics/2017/02/09/trump-says-
big-league-tax-reform-details-coming-in-weeks.html.
2. See Jacob Pramuk, The White House Just Outlined Its Tax Plan. Here’s What’s in It,
CNBC (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/26/the-white-house-just-outlined-its-
tax-plan-heres-whats-in-it.html.
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mestic industry),3 the final reform bill ultimately left this controversial
provision out.
This Article argues, in light of economic theory and the Modigliani-
Miller Irrelevance Theorem (“MMT”), that new taxation measures impact
corporate decision-making in a way that leads to unintended results that
can limit the effectiveness of reform.  Section I of this Article presents the
Trump tax reforms, including the promises campaigned on, the post-elec-
tion White House pronouncements, and the adjustments made in the final
bill, with a focus on the tax changes that impact businesses and corpora-
tions.  Section II presents several economic theories, including the MMT,
and surveys the results of two empirical studies (one involving the repatri-
ation efforts of President Bush’s Homeland Investment Act of 2004 and
another in relation to an unexpected change in 2006 to the way that Cana-
dian income trusts were taxed) and several other recent academic studies.
Collectively, these studies will show that new tax reforms do not always
generate their desired results due to firms’ tendencies to adapt their poli-
cies in light of new tax measures to obtain more favorable treatment.  Sec-
tion II concludes by applying these theories to the Trump tax reforms to
show how the changes may lead to unexpected results as companies adjust
their policies.
Section III will examine whether a BAT is an unconstitutional direct
tax4 that is not apportioned among the states and that does not qualify as
income under the Sixteenth amendment.5  This Section will highlight both
sides of this debate and will survey the limited instances where federal tax
legislation has been overturned by the courts on constitutional grounds.
In so doing, the Article will also briefly survey the history of the constitu-
tional sections at play, discuss the interpretive variance in the definition of
“tax on income,” and examine the ongoing debate in academic literature
and case law on the purpose and breadth of the definition of “direct tax.”
Additionally, this Section surveys other legal arguments that might be
presented in a BAT challenge to further illustrate that a successful chal-
lenge to the BAT on constitutional grounds would be a very difficult un-
dertaking given the substantive arguments in favor of its constitutionality,
the wide discretion of Congress to enact tax laws, and the rarity of judicial
intervention in this area.
Lastly, in Section IV, the Article considers the role of economic analy-
sis on the issue of tax law constitutionality and briefly reviews the history
of economic analysis in matters of tax litigation (with particular attention
given to the decisions of Judge Richard Posner).  It also attempts to de-
duce an interpretative tool for determining the applicability of economic
analysis on constitutional questions.  Section IV also reviews the argu-
3. See The White House Hints That Tax Reform Could Pay for the Border Wall, THE
ECONOMIST (Feb. 3, 2017), http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2017/01/
taxes-and-tariffs.
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
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ments for and against the use of economic analysis in tax litigation, in light
of particular instances where such analysis has been applied.  The Article
concludes that economic analysis could potentially be utilized under “pub-
lic interest theory”6 or in cases where the legislation discriminated against
certain regions.7  Such applications of economic analysis, however, would
require significant data (which may be difficult to generate).
I. TRUMP TAX REFORM: FULFILLING CAMPAIGN PROMISES
On October 22, 2016, at a campaign rally in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania,
President Trump stated that he “couldn’t stand by and watch any longer.”8
He explained that he was going to help change a “broken system” by en-
tering into a “contract between Donald J. Trump and the American voter”
to restore honesty, restore accountability, and bring change to Washing-
ton.9  His contract identified six measures to “fight corruption and special
interest collusion,” seven actions to “protect American workers,” five ac-
tions to “restore security and the constitutional rule of law,” and a detailed
plan for his first 100 days in office—including several legislative enact-
ments that he was going to fight to quickly pass.10
One such measure was a substantial tax reform proposal, which Trump
described as a “Middle Class Tax Relief and Simplification Act,”11 aimed
at providing tax relief to middle class Americans, simplifying the tax code,
and growing the American economy.  The plan included sweeping reforms
aimed at encouraging investment and creating jobs such as: rate drops for
middle class individuals and families, the removal of several tax brackets
(from seven to three), eliminating the marriage penalty and the Alterna-
tive Minimum Tax (“AMT”), and repealing the death tax.12
The plan also promised “revenue neutrality” and “fiscal responsibil-
ity.”  It claimed to accomplish this goal by reducing or eliminating certain
deductions and loopholes for higher income earners and by putting an end
to the way “carried interest” was treated for partnerships that were not
6. See Richard Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Con-
stitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 265 (1982) [hereinafter Posner Economics].
7. See generally Richard A. Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Document, 56
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 4, 28 (1987) [hereinafter Posner Constitution].
8. See TRUMP PENCE CAMPAIGN, https://www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releases/
donald-j.-trump-delivers-groundbreaking-contract-for-the-american-vote1 (last visited Feb. 1,
2017). See also Deroy Murdock, Trump’s Gettysburg Address Overflows With Conservative
Ideas, NAT’L REVIEW (Oct. 26, 2016), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/441458/donald-
trump-contract-american-voter-gettysburg-address.
9. Id.
10. TRUMP PENCE CAMPAIGN, supra note 8.
11. Id.
12. See generally Robert W. Wood, Trump Tax Plan Could Impact 2016 Year-End
Planning, FORBES (Nov. 14, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2016/11/14/
trump-tax-plan-could-impact-2016-year-end-planning/#24abab7d530d. See also REUTERS,
How Donald Trump’s Tax Repatriation Plan Will Create Jobs, FORTUNE (Nov. 24, 2016),
http://fortune.com/2016/11/24/donald-trump-repatriation-tax-plan-jobs/.
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creating jobs or engaging in risk.13  In theory, these cuts would be paid for
by a one-time “deemed repatriation” of corporate profits held internation-
ally (at a discounted 10% tax rate) that would no longer allow corpora-
tions to defer income earned abroad and by reducing (or eliminating)
loopholes for “special interests.”14
The reform measures relating to business and real estate15 taxation
were also significant.  Trump’s campaign plan mirrored the June 2016
“Better Way” corporate tax overhaul introduced by Republican House
Speaker, Paul Ryan, and House Ways and Means Committee Chair, Kevin
Brady.16  It promised to make “America’s tax rate one of the best in the
world” through a reduction in the corporate tax rate to 15 percent.17  In
addition, Trump proposed an “up-front” deduction for major projects, the
removal of the business deduction for interest on debt, and a “border ad-
justment” policy that would favor exporters over importers by allowing
export revenue to be excluded when a company calculated its taxable in-
come.18  Trump also canvassed the idea of a tariff on imports by “execu-
tive order” in the range of 5 to 10 percent.19
A. Initial Reception
The Trump campaign’s tax proposals quickly attracted criticism by
economists and corporate interests (including Koch Industries).20  For ex-
ample, Nobel Prize recipient and Columbia Professor, Joseph Stiglitz,
commented on Trump’s proposed tax plan at a January 6, 2017 meeting of
the American Economic Association stating, “There is a broad consensus
that the kind of policies that our president-elect has proposed are among
the policies that will not work.”21  Further, Rebecca Kysar suggested that
Trump’s tariff by “executive order” was unconstitutional given the “Origi-
13. See Wood, supra note 12.
14. See id.
15. See Peter Grant & Laura Kisisto, Real-Estate Industry Braces for Tax Upheaval,
WALL ST. JOURNAL (Dec. 30, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/real-estate-industry-braces-
for-tax-upheaval-1482871455.
16. See A BETTER WAY PLAN, http://abetterway.speaker.gov/?page=tax-reform (last
visited Sept. 24, 2017).
17. See TRUMP PENCE CAMPAIGN, supra note 8.
18. See id.
19. Rebecca Kysar, Is Trump’s Tariff Plan Constitutional? N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/03/opinion/is-trumps-tariff-plan-constitutional.html.
20. See House Republicans are Proposing a Big Corporate Tax Cut that Walmart Hates,
VOX (Dec. 25, 2016), http://www.vox.com/2016/12/25/14069822/corporate-tax-border-adjusta
bility.
21. Rich Miller, Trumponomics Gets the Thumbs Down from Nobel-Winning Econo-
mists, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 1, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-06/
trumponomics-gets-thumbs-down-from-nobel-prize-winner-economists.
6 Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review [Vol. 7:1
nation Clause”22 of the U.S. Constitution whereby all tariffs (as well as
taxes and other revenue generating laws) must originate with Congress.23
Additionally, Lawrence Summers, former Harvard President and eco-
nomic advisor to President Barack Obama, in an op-ed piece published by
the Washington Post on January 8, 201724 identified three problematic ele-
ments of the Trump-Ryan proposals: the immediate deductibility of “in-
vestment outlays” (in the year they are made), the non-deductibility of
debt interest payments, and the BAT.25  Summers also suggested that the
World Trade Organization and the global economic community at large
would likely interpret these changes as “protectionist” in possible viola-
tion of U.S. treaty obligations.  Summers based his hypothesis on the like-
lihood that the proposal would cause U.S. dollar appreciation, damage
foreign debtors, and increase global volatility as “U.S. foreign assets are
mostly held in foreign currencies whereas debts are largely in dollars.”26
B. Post Election White House Announcements and Critiques
On April 26, 2017, the White House formally announced several tax
reforms.  In a summary briefing to reporters, Chief Economic Advisor,
Gary Cohn, and Treasury Secretary, Steve Mnuchin, stated that the Trump
administration would cut the number of tax brackets from seven to three
(at 35, 25, and 10 percent respective rates); adopt a “territorial tax sys-
tem”; cut the corporate tax rate to 15 percent; eliminate certain deductions
(including mortgage interest and charitable contribution deductions); insti-
tute a “one-time tax” of money held abroad by U.S. corporations; and
remove the estate tax, Obamacare taxes, and the AMT.27
Although the White House included a fact sheet with their briefing,
there were several ambiguities in the announcement, including: the “in-
come ranges” for the new personal tax brackets, the tax rate for the “one
time” overseas corporate tax, and the details on the White House’s sugges-
tion to move to a “territorial tax system.”28  Additionally, the fact sheet
did not clearly indicate when Congress would introduce the formal legisla-
tion for these reforms.  Some commentators responded to the announce-
ments by suggesting that the reforms would be less effective as many large
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl.1.
23. Kysar, supra note 19.
24. Lawrence Summers, Opinion, Trump and Ryan are Right to Tackle Corporate






27. Pramuk, supra note 2.
28. Id.
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companies in technology make and leave profits in lower tax countries—as
such the lower corporate rate would not have a significant impact.29
C. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
On November 2, 2017, a Republican-sponsored tax reform bill, the Tax
Cuts and Jobs Act,30 was introduced to Congress incorporating most (but
omitting some) of the tax reform proposals campaigned on by President
Trump and also identified by the White House in their spring briefing.
The bill passed through both the House and the Senate without significant
opposition and was signed into law by President Trump on December 22,
2017 who described the reform as a “boon for the middle-class.”31  The bill
ushered in significant changes for both individual and corporate tax filers,
facilitating what has been described as a “mad scramble to understand the
bill’s impact on both a macroeconomic level and an individual level.”32
From a corporate perspective, the final bill jettisoned the controversial
BAT provision but included corporate rate cuts (permanently to 21 per-
cent), a deduction for pass throughs, a repeal of the AMT, the establish-
ment of a territorial system of taxation for businesses, and a one-time
mandatory repatriation tax of 8 percent on illiquid assets and 15.5 percent
on liquid assets held overseas.33  The bill also set interest deduction limits,
changed the rules pertaining to capital expensing (allowing for large scale
immediate write-offs), and implemented anti-base erosion measures, while
preserving credits for clean energy and “carried interest loopholes” for
certain fund managers.34
In the Section that follows, the Article introduces several financial the-
ories as well as empirical studies to show how firms will adjust their behav-
ior in light of new tax reform measures.  As a result, sweeping tax reforms
can have untended consequences.  The Article will also address the spe-
cific unintended consequences that could occur in light of the reforms
passed in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017.
29. See Yoree Koh, Trump Tax Plan Doesn’t Solve Tech’s Multibillion-Dollar Over-
seas-Cash Problem, WALL ST. JOURNAL (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-
tax-plan-doesnt-solve-techs-multibillion-dollar-overseas-cash-problem-1493298005.
30. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, H.R.1, 115th Cong. (2017).
31. See Shannon Pettypiece, Trump Signs $1.5 Trillion Tax Cut in First Major Legisla-
tive Win, Bloomberg (Dec. 22, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-22/
trump-signs-1-5-trillion-tax-cut-in-first-major-legislative-win.
32. See Bob Bryan, It’s Done: Massive Republican Tax Bill Passes Congress in Genera-
tional Overhaul, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 20, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/trump-gop-
tax-reform-bill-pass-house-bracket-rates-changes-2017-12.
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II. HOW FIRMS ADJUST BEHAVIOR IN LIGHT OF NEW TAXES
A. The Modigliani-Miller Irrelevance Theorem Origins,
Central Premise, and Application
The Modigliani-Miller Irrelevance Theorem (“MMT”) was developed
by economists Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller while the two authors
worked as professors at Carnegie Mellon University.  They later jointly
published their research in a 1958 paper entitled “The Cost of Capital,
Corporate Finance and the Theory of Investment” in the America Eco-
nomic Review.35  This paper was later supplemented and partially cor-
rected in a 1963 follow-up paper entitled “Corporate Income Taxes and
the Cost of Capital: A Correction.”36
The central premise of the MMT is that the value of a company is
independent of its capital structure.  The MMT holds that it is irrelevant
whether a company is capitalized with debt or equity provided certain as-
sumptions are met (no taxes; no transaction, bankruptcy, or agency costs;
no asymmetrical information; and the presence of efficient markets).  In
other words, management of a company cannot change its value by
manipulating its balance sheet composition.37
The corollary of the MMT is that in a world where taxes, transaction
costs, and inefficient markets exist—a reality that has often led to criticism
of the MMT38—companies will be willing to make changes to their poli-
35. Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporate Finance
and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 267 (1958) [hereinafter MM 1958].
36. Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of
Capital: A Correction, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 433 (1963) [hereinafter MM 1963].
37. See generally MM 1958, supra note 35. See also Herbert Hovenkamp, Neoclassi-
cism and the Separation of Ownership and Control, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 373, 396 (2009)
(“Modigliani-Miller extends this observation to choices about the firm’s financial structure.
In the absence of transaction or agency costs, the value of the firm is invariant to the way that
it is financed—either by increasing ownership through equity or by increasing borrowing
through debt. The corollary is that in the presence of such costs, the firm will select the more
profitable alternative. As a result, the firm’s choice about whether to issue more shares or
take on more debt is driven entirely by the presence of frictions in the system, such as taxes,
agency problems, other internal inefficiencies, or imperfect information, but not by any no-
tion that the firm is inherently more valuable under one or another form of organization.
Further, its choice of a debt-to-equity ratio is entirely independent of the individual wishes of
shareholders.”); Remus D. Valsan & Moin A. Yahya, Shareholders, Creditors, and Directors’
Fiduciary Duties: A Law and Finance Approach, 2 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 1, 30-31 (2007) (“Sup-
pose there is a firm that lives for one period. The firm has a cash flow x, which has an
expected value of E[x]. The face value of debt is D, and the shareholders are the residual
claimants. The shareholders will receive the maximum of x – D or $0. The debt holders have
first claim on the cash flow if the firm cannot pay them D. Hence, the debt holders will
receive the minimum of D or x. The value of equity, therefore, is E[max [0, x – D]], while the
value of debt is E[min [x,D]]. The value of the firm is the value of equity plus the value of
debt, which is equal to E[max [0, x – D]] + E[min [x, D]] = E[x]. The value of the firm is
independent of capital structure as only the expected value of x is determinate of the
value.”).
38. See Razeen Sappideen, Imputation of the Corporate and Personal Income Tax: Is It
Chasing One’s Tail? 15 AM. J. TAX. POL’Y 167, 172-73 (1998) (“The Modigliani-Miller theo-
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cies and capital structure to benefit from or mitigate against the existence
of these costs.39  Peter H. Huang and Michael S. Kroll have described this
predilection as the “Reverse M&M Theorem.”40  Notably, the MMT au-
thors in their 1963 paper acknowledged this phenomenon.41
The effects of the MMT have been identified in academic literature
and in corporate decision making across various contexts, including: deal
structuring42 (where it has been noted that lawyers can design deals to
rem has been criticized on the grounds that neither of its assumptions reflect reality. For
example, markets are imperfect, corporations and shareholders pay taxes, and the corpora-
tion’s investment decisions are very much dependent on its dividend and financing decisions.
Nonetheless, the theorem provides deep insights into the nature of corporate inflows and
outflows and their impact, or lack thereof, on corporate investors.”).
39. See generally Adam O. Emmerich, Hybrid Instruments and the Debt-Equity Dis-
tinction in Corporate Taxation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 118, 137 (1985) (“It is surprisingly difficult
to identify specific reasons why the Modigliani-Miller model does not correspond to empiri-
cal observation. The root of the problem would seem to lie in the assumptions upon which
the model apparently depends, which do not hold true in the real world. For example, the
Modigliani-Miller analysis ignores taxes, though a real firm’s capital structure obviously will
affect the value of the firm by affecting the amount of taxes that it must pay. As the firm
increases the amount of debt that it carries, an increasing proportion of its earnings must go
to creditors in the form of interest payments. Because such payments are deductible from
earnings in computing taxable income, while comparable payments on equity (i.e., dividends)
are not, the increased debt will result in tax savings, and the firm’s cost of capital will fall.”).
40. See Peter H. Huang & Michael S. Knoll, Corporate Finance, Corporate Law and
Finance Theory, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 175, 191 (2000) (“The Reverse M&M Theorem also
suggests how to evaluate the tax law’s treatment of capital structure, such as its relative treat-
ments of debt and equity. If the other M&M assumptions were true, the tax advantage pro-
vided by debt would have no social welfare cost. Firms would use more debt, but this would
simply be equivalent to a reduction in corporate taxes. It is because the other assumptions
are not true that the tax-advantaged treatment of debt has real economic costs. Because
bankruptcy and financial distress costs are positive, the tax-favored treatment of debt encour-
ages more debt, increasing these costs. Moreover, because not all activities and assets have
the same financial distress costs, some activities can support more debt than others. Accord-
ingly, the tax system mis-allocates investment by encouraging investment in projects that can
be heavily debt-financed and discouraging it in projects that cannot.”).
41. See MM 1963, supra note 36, at 293.
42. See Michael S. Knoll & Daniel M.G. Raff, A Comprehensive Theory of Deal Struc-
ture: Understanding How Transactional Structure Creates Value, 89 TEX. L. REV. 35, 47-48
(2010) (“Instead, we believe that the reverse Modigliani-Miller theorem provides the com-
prehensive theory of transactional structuring that Professor Fleischer is seeking. For more
than a quarter of a century, the legal literature has sought to assess what transactional law-
yers do by compiling a comprehensive list of high-value-added tasks performed by business
lawyers. The literature has proceeded by looking at what lawyers do and trying to distill from
those observations what tasks are central. Such an approach produces an ad hoc list of factors
with no assurance that the resulting list is exhaustive and not redundant. In contrast, our
approach starts with finance theory (particularly the Modigliani-Miller theorem of capital-
structure irrelevancy) and draws directly from that theorem’s assumptions the factors that
can potentially affect value. It is because that theorem is widely accepted by economists as
true (albeit not an accurate description of reality) that it provides assurances that all relevant
factors have been included. It is, therefore, a much better place to begin an analysis than an
ad hoc list. Because it provides a complete partitioning of the factors through which transac-
tional structures can create value, the reverse Modigliani-Miller theorem provides a ground-
ing that an analyst, a deal principal, or an agent (such as a lawyer or a banker) can use to
10 Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review [Vol. 7:1
reduce taxes and transactions costs),43 financial engineering, transfer pric-
ing,44 securities innovation,45 financing and derivatives hedging,46 regula-
tory matters (including the enactment of various corporate, business, and
securities statutes and regulations),47 and litigation.48  The MMT has also
been cited as a major factor in influencing bankruptcy matters49 and the
evaluate an assertion that some transactional structure is better than an alternative structure.
That grounding comes in two forms. First, an analyst or practitioner can look directly at the
sizable finance literature on deal structures for literature analyzing a specific deal structure.
Second, and more to the point, an analyst or practitioner can use the approach directly by
comparing how two or more alternative structures differ in terms of providing informational
content, affecting transaction costs (including agency costs), and affecting regulatory costs.”).
See also Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pric-
ing, 94 YALE L.J. 239 (1984).
43. Knoll & Raff, supra note 42, at 45.
44. See generally Robert Ackerman & Elizabeth Chorvat, Modern Financial Theory
and Transfer Pricing, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 637 (2002).
45. See Mark P. Gergen & Paula Schmitz, The Influence of Tax Law on Securities
Innovation in the United States, 52 TAX L. REV. 119, 120 (1997) (“From the perspective of
finance, the tax law is riddled with opportunities for ‘pure tax arbitrage’ meaning opportuni-
ties to take risk-free and costless financial positions that have a positive yield in taxes
saved.”). See also David F. Bradford, Fixing Realization Accounting: Symmetry, Consistency
and Correctness in the Taxation of Financial Instruments, 50 TAX L. REV. 731, 739-43 (1995).
46. See Huang & Knoll, supra note 40, at 185-86 (“First, hedging can create value for
shareholders by reducing taxes. Although the corporate tax structure is fairly flat, there is an
important asymmetry. Firms with positive taxable income in any year pay taxes, but firms
with a loss do not get refunds. Instead, these firms have no tax liability. Because of this
asymmetry, a firm with highly volatile earnings will have a higher expected tax liability than a
firm with steady earnings. This creates an incentive for firms to hedge in order to reduce their
taxes. By making their income more stable, such firms can reduce their expected taxes. Since
the government takes less, more is left for shareholders.”).
47. Id. at 189 (“However, because the M&M assumptions are not accurate, the laws
regulating investor relations can affect the firm values through taxes, and information and
agency costs. Consider corporate law, which in the United States is state law. Although each
state has its own corporate law, more than half of the Fortune 500 and more than forty
percent of the companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange are incorporated in Dela-
ware. If the law had no effect on value, it would be surprising to find so many firms incorpo-
rated in such a small state where many of them had no other operations. Although
commentators have debated whether Delaware law increases or decreases total value, the
Reverse M&M Theorem tells us where to look.”).
48. See generally Sappideen, supra note 38, at 171. See also Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The
Relation and Integration of Individual and Corporate Income Taxes, 94 HARV. L. REV. 719,
748-49 (1981).
49. See Emmerich, supra note 39, at 137-38, (“It has been suggested that the existence
of positive costs of bankruptcy explains why an all-debt capital structure is not even theoreti-
cally desirable. The expected cost of bankruptcy will increase as the firm takes on more debt
because the firm is more likely to go bankrupt as its fixed obligations increase. A firm’s
optimal debt-equity ratio would be the point at which the marginal decrease in the cost of
capital resulting from the addition of debt equals the marginal increase in the expected cost
of bankruptcy. If the expected cost of bankruptcy is relatively trivial, however—and it seems
that it is—this argument does not explain observed deviations from an all-debt capital
structure.”).
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effect that “bankruptcy costs” have on the value of a firm.50  John Ayer
notes, “Modigliani and Miller have helped to focus attention on the degree
to which bankruptcy (or the threat of bankruptcy) imposes a real-world
cost that may vary from the ‘ideal’ assumptions.”51
Surprisingly, given its importance to financial theory, the MMT has
been the subject of very little judicial review.  Professor Merton Miller,
nonetheless, has been cited in an expert capacity in a variety of cases, in-
cluding commodity futures trading52 and securities regulation.53  He also
appeared as an expert witness in cases regarding eminent domain54 and in
a class action matter relating to losses sustained after the “Black Monday”
stock market crash of October 19, 1987.55  Additionally, various theories
in corporation finance—jointly developed by Modigliani and Miller and
ancillary to the MMT—have been discussed in the context of bank-
50. John D. Ayer, The Role of Finance Theory in Shaping Bankruptcy Policy, 3 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 53, 82-83 (1995) (“As previously noted, Modigliani and Miller was a
kind of ‘clean test- tubes’ hypothesis from its inception. No one ever suggested that leverage
is irrelevant ‘in the real world.’ The discussion generally turns on ways in which Modigliani
and Miller fails to conform to ‘the real world.’ In the real world of bankruptcy, there is the
matter of ‘bankruptcy costs.’ The question here is whether and to what extent leverage, by
increasing the possibility of bankruptcy, imposes ‘deadweight costs’ that may absolutely re-
duce the value of the firm. At least potentially, these costs are of two different sorts: ‘direct
costs’, such as professional fees (there is a small but important literature attempting to mea-
sure these direct costs); and perhaps of greater interest, ‘indirect costs’ (costs that arise when
customers refuse to do business with a firm at risk of bankruptcy, or the higher costs of doing
business that a firm faces in such a plight).”).
51. Id. at 59-60 (“Regarding debt-equity structure, in an earlier time it was conven-
tional wisdom that there was a proper leverage structure for any given firm. Indeed, one of
the goals of regulatory policy was to assist in finding and enforcing that regulatory structure.
Modigliani and Miller argue (in the same vein as before), that under defined assumptions it
makes no difference what the debt-equity structure might be—the value of the firm remains
the same in any event. It is important to stress that no one (least of all Modigliani and Miller)
supposes that the ideal world resembles the real world. Nor must it follow that the real world
must necessarily be made to perform more like the ideal. The real point of the Modigliani
and Miller propositions is that they help formulate useful avenues of inquiry. If the real
world varies from the ideal, then why? Thus Modigliani and Miller has helped to focus atten-
tion on the seeming inconsistencies in the tax treatment of different kinds of claims (the
corporation gets to deduct interest from income before taxes, but there is no corresponding
deduction for dividends, to take just one example).”).
52. See Elliott v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 202 F.3d 926 (7th Cir. 2000),
reh’g and suggestion for reh’g en banc denied (May 11, 2000).
53. See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. SEC, 187 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 1999), reh’g denied (Oct 07,
1999); see also Metlyn Realty Corp. v. Esmark, Inc., F.2d 826 (7th Cir. 1985).
54. See Lakehead Pipeline Co. v. Ill. Commerce Comm’n, 296 N.E.2d 345, 348 (D. Ill.
1998), as modified on denial of reh’g 696 N.E.2d 345 (July 16, 1998).
55. See Spicer v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc. 844 F. Supp. 1226, 1237 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
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ruptcy,56 tax law (in the context of deduction disputes),57 and antitrust.58
The judiciary has also acknowledged the MMT in a tort case involving
wrongful misappropriation,59 a telecommunications matter,60 an Arizona
public utilities case,61 a fraudulent conveyances case,62 a case involving the
constitutionality of the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973,63 and a
case involving taxation.64  The area where the MMT has led to the most
judicial review is in breach of contract cases that involve damage assess-
ments related to the savings and loan industry.65  In 2003, Roger Citron
identified the area where most judicial review of the MMT has taken
56. See In re Lahijani, 325 B.R. 282, 289 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005).
57. See Grojean v. Comm’r, 248 F.3d 572, 574 (7th Cir. 2001) (“At a high enough level
of abstraction, it is true, the difference between providing and enabling the provision of fund-
ing may disappear. Indeed, at that level, the difference between equity and debt, as methods
of corporate financing, disappears.”). See also MM 1958, supra note 35, at 361 (“But at the
operational level, because of various frictions that some economic models disregard, such as
transaction and liquidity costs, there really is a substantive and not merely a formal differ-
ence between lending and guaranteeing.”).
58. United States v. Tracinda Inv. Corp., 477 F. Supp. 1093 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
59. See FMC Corp. v. Boesky 852 F.2d 981, 997 (7th Cir. 1988).
60. See MPower Commc’ns Corp. v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 457 F.3d 625, 631 (7th Cir. 2006).
See generally Michael J. Barclay & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., The Capital Structure Puzzle: The
Evidence Revisited, 17 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8 (2005); Merton H. Miller, Leverage, 46 J. FIN.
479 (1991); Stewart C. Myers, Capital Structure, 15 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 81 (2001).
61. See Ariz. Corp. Comm’n v. Citizens Util. Co., 584 P.2d 1175, 1183 n.7 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1978) (“There is some disagreement among economists as to whether capital structure
has any effect on cost of capital. Some contend there is no such effect.”). See also MM 1958,
supra note 35.
62. In re Consol. Capital Equities Corp., 175 B.R. 629, 633 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1994).
63. See In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 384 F. Supp. 895 (Reg’l Rail Reorg. Ct. 1974).
64. See S. Pacific Transp. Co. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 11 Or. Tax 138, 152 (1989) (“With
this issue we have reached a level of financial theory which may be described as one of
diminished clarity. One school of thought appears to be that capital structure has very little
effect on the cost of capital. The extreme position of that school is the Modigliani-Miller
proposition which holds that capital structure does not affect the total cost of capital. How-
ever, this proposition is subject to the realities that taxes do impact capital costs. In short, the
proposition may not apply except in a ‘perfect market.’”).
65. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996); Bluebonnet Sav. Bank
FSB v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 231 (2005), aff’d sub nom. Bluebonnet Sav. Bank FSB v.
United States, 466 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2006); LaSalle Talman Bank, F.S.B. v. United States
64 Fed. Cl. 90 (2005); Cal. Federal Bank, FSB v. United States 245 F.3d 1342, (Fed. Cir.
2001), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied (Jul 10, 2001); Glendale Federal Bank, FSB v. United
States, 43 Fed. Cl. 390 (1999).
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place: the Court of Federal Claims.66  Citron notes, however, that not all
decisions have looked upon MMT favorably.67
66. Rodger D. Citron, Culture Clash? The Miller & Modigliani Propositions Meet The
United States Court of Federal Claims, 22 REV. LITIG. 319, 321-22 (2003) (“In turn, the Court
of Federal Claims has become a forum for evaluating the relevance of the basic principles of
corporate finance—specifically, the Miller & Modigliani (‘M&M’) Propositions concerning
capital structure and debt-equity ratios—to claims by savings and loan institutions for lost
profits damages. In their 1958 article, Professors Merton Miller and Franco Modigliani set
out a number of foundational principles of corporate finance, including the principle that the
value of a private firm is independent of the mix of debt and equity used to fund its assets.
The results thus far are mixed. The courts have not embraced the M&M Propositions, as
evidenced by their decisions to allow plaintiffs to present claims for lost profits damages and,
in a smaller number of cases, their discussion of the M&M Propositions. Nevertheless, courts
generally have arrived at the results dictated by the M&M Propositions in awarding damages
to claimants.”); see also id. at 323 (“The United States, citing the M&M Propositions, has
insisted that the only recoverable damages by a claimant are its mitigation costs—that is, the
costs associated with obtaining replacement capital. The thrift claimants have responded that
they were unable to mitigate and, therefore, should be entitled to present claims for lost
profits damages. Furthermore, they have argued that the M&M Propositions are not relevant
to the evaluation of their claims given the availability of deposit insurance, which they insist
is a subsidy of that particular form of debt.”).
67. See Glendale, 43 Fed. Cl. at 401 n.4 (“The court finds the testimony of Nobel Lau-
reate Merton Miller, a brilliant scholar, regarding the value of leverage of little utility in this
case. Professor Miller testified that any contention that Glendale lost something of value was
meritless because leverage, standing alone, has no value. Plaintiffs convincingly point out
that, notwithstanding the general principle of finance for which Dr. Miller won the Nobel
Prize in Economics in 1990, the situation of thrifts and other lending institutions is different,
because they have access to low-cost, government insured borrowings (retail deposits) which
are unavailable to other institutions. In addition, the court realizes that other factors, includ-
ing a thrift’s management, the markets it operates in, and its retail branch network, are all
relevant to taking advantage of the access to leverage and profiting from it. Banks are ulti-
mately in the business of making money by lending money, and generating a return based on
the spread between interest earning assets and interest bearing liabilities.”). See also Citron,
supra note 66, at 323-24 (“In 1999, the Court of Federal Claims entered a $909 million judg-
ment, one of the largest ever entered against the United States, in the first supervisory good-
will damages decision, Glendale Federal Bank v. United States. In allowing the thrift
claimant to present a claim for lost profits, the trial court did not agree with the United
States’ arguments based upon the M&M Propositions and expressly rejected the testimony of
Dr. Miller as ‘theoretical.’ The trial court did not, however, award lost profits. Subsequently,
in 2001, an appeals court vacated the judgment in Glendale and remanded the case to the
trial court for further proceedings.  In the journey from the Supreme Court’s decision in
Winstar to the current damages decisions, the lower courts developed a more complete un-
derstanding of the economics of the savings and loan industry, and of the accounting tech-
niques used by regulators during the 1980s. As a result, the courts generally have awarded
judgments that amount to the reimbursement of reliance expenditures.  At the same time,
the courts generally have not been persuaded to apply the M&M Propositions in resolving
the thrifts’ claims for damages. Indeed, the only trial court decision to embrace the M&M
Propositions—a summary judgment in favor of the United States and against California Fed-
eral Bank on the thrift’s claim for lost profits—was reversed by the Federal Circuit, which
concluded that the thrift was entitled to a trial on that particular claim.”).
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B. Behavioral and Policy Adaptation in Response to New Taxes
When MMT assumptions fail (for example, in the presence of taxes) a
corporation will adapt its policies.  Gergen & Schmitz note, “From the
perspective of finance, the tax law is riddled with opportunities for ‘pure
tax arbitrage,’ meaning opportunities to take risk-free and costless finan-
cial positions that have a positive yield in taxes saved.”68  Tax policies have
also been cited by Miller as an influence in the creation of “zero-coupon
bonds.”69  In fact, companies have always used tax inconsistencies to maxi-
mize their value.70 These policies also influence acquisitions and corpo-
rate cash held internationally.71
When corporations are taxed, an increase in those taxes will reduce the
company’s value.72 As a result, a company will have an incentive to
change its policies and its capital structure to obtain more preferential tax
treatment.  One of the most readily identifiable examples of this is the
deductibility by a firm of interest payments on debt.  Hovenkamp notes:
[T]o the extent that debt receives tax treatment that is more favorable than
the treatment given to dividends, the impact will be to shift firms more toward
debt. This could result in excessive leverage and fixed interest cost commit-
ments that cannot be paid in the event of a financial downturn.73
In other words, taxes cause companies to finance with debt instead of eq-
uity because interest payments have historically been deductible against
income, whereas dividend payments have not.74
Given the MMT and the fact that interest payments are deductible
while dividends are not, one would expect to see significant evidence of
68. Gergen & Schmitz, supra note 45, at 120. See also David F. Bradford, Fixing Reali-
zation Accounting: Symmetry, Consistency and Correctness in the Taxation of Financial In-
struments, 50 TAX L. REV. 731, 739-43 (1995).
69. See Merton H. Miller, Financial Innovation: The Last Twenty Years and the Next,
21 J. FIN. AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 459, 461-63 (1986).
70. See generally Knoll & Raff, supra note 42.
71. See Does U.S. Corporate Tax Rate Incentivize Foreign Acquisitions, FORBES (Oct.
31, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/joeharpaz/2013/10/31/does-u-s-corporate-tax-rate-in
centivize-foreign-acquisitions/#2b6b78fb69e8.
72. See MM 1958, supra note 35; see also Merton Miller, Debt and Taxes, 32 J. FIN.
261, 261-75 (1977); Alan Kraus & Robert Litzenberger, A State-Preference Model of Optimal
Financial Leverage, 28 J. FIN. 911, 911–22 (1973); Harry DeAngelo & Ronald Masulis, Opti-
mal Capital Structure Under Corporate and Personal Taxation, 8 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1983); John
Graham, How Big Are The Tax Benefits of Debt?, 55 J. FIN. 1901, 1901–41 (2000); Richard
Green & Burton Hollifield, The Personal-Tax Advantages of Equity, 67 J. FIN. ECON. 175
(2003).
73. Hovenkamp, supra note 37, at 396.
74. See Sappideen, supra note 38, at 171 (“The corporation income tax is said to en-
courage debt financing rather than equity financing because interest is ordinarily deductible
under most tax systems, whereas dividends are not. The over reliance on debt financing is
claimed to cause a welfare loss by increasing the vulnerability of corporations to bankruptcy.
In other words, the elimination of the double taxation of dividends, it is claimed, will reduce
the occurrence of bankruptcy not only by making equity financing more attractive vis-a-vis
debt financing, but also by making equity holdings more attractive in their own right.”).
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the widespread use by firms of debt over equity; however, this is not ex-
actly the case.  There are many companies that choose to finance their
activities solely with equity, despite the tax deductibility of interest pay-
ments.75  Further, the introduction of taxes into the MMT model leads to a
difficult calculation in determining the optimal debt to equity ratios.76  It
has been suggested by Emmerich that sometimes a company will choose
equity over debt because of other costs (assumed to be zero in the MMT),
such as increased bankruptcy risk due to higher levels of leverage.  Em-
merich explains, “A firm’s optimal debt-equity ratio would be the point at
which the marginal decrease in the cost of capital resulting from the addi-
tion of debt equals the marginal increase in the expected cost of bank-
ruptcy.”77  Another factor that impacts corporate debt to equity ratios is
the personal rates of taxation for shareholders or holders of debt.78  Also,
75. Emmerich, supra note 39, at 137.
76. See Valsan & Yahya, supra note 37, at 31 (“When corporate taxes are taken into
account, the analysis gets complicated. Suppose interest payments are tax deductible, then
the value of equity is E[max [0, (1 – t)x – (1 – t)D]], where t is the corporate tax rate, the
value of debt is E[min [x, D]], and the value of the firm is E[x ⏐ x<D, (1 – t)x + tD ⏐ x>D].
Now the value of the firm is increasing in the amount of debt, and this suggests that the firm
should be fully leveraged. This is never observed, nor would anyone believe this to be a
reasonable strategy. Various authors have sought to explain what could be constraining the
leverage decisions of a firm, with a view to determining the optimal debt level. For example,
a group of scholars argued that as the firm borrows more, there is a higher risk of bankruptcy
costs. These costs can be direct, such as the expenses that need to be paid to lawyers when
liquidating the assets of a firm. They can also be indirect, such as lost profits, the disruption
of supplies, managers demanding higher compensation for potential unemployment, and
other such costs that may result if the firm declared bankruptcy. In fact, bankruptcy costs can
be taken to be a metaphor for all such disadvantages that a highly leveraged firm may signal
to market participants. If taxes and bankruptcy costs were the only costs and benefits to debt
and equity, the discussion would be trivial. Debt, in fact, has many other advantages beyond
tax deductions.”).
77. Emmerich, supra note 39, at 138.
78. See Id. at 138-39 (“A firm’s optimal debt-equity ratio would be the point at which
the marginal decrease in the cost of capital resulting from the addition of debt equals the
marginal increase in the expected cost of bankruptcy. If the expected cost of bankruptcy is
relatively trivial, however—and it seems that it is—this argument does not explain observed
deviations from an all-debt capital structure. Moreover, Merton Miller has shown that the
Modigliani-Miller hypothesis remains intact once the personal income tax is taken into ac-
count in addition to the corporate tax.  While payments on debt are deductible at the corpo-
rate level, debt holders are taxed more heavily than equity holders at the individual level
because much of the return on equity may be unrealized capital gains that will not be taxed
for years to come while interest payments are taxed immediately as ordinary income. There is
an equilibrium debt-equity ratio for the corporate sector as a whole that depends upon the
corporate tax rate and the individual tax rates of all the various investors; each firm adopts a
particular capital structure in order to appeal to a particular class of investor that is seeking
investments with a particular tax characteristic. Miller argues, however, that there is no opti-
mal capital structure for any given firm and that it is still true “that the value of any firm, in
equilibrium, [is] independent of its capital structure, despite the deductibility of interest pay-
ments in computing corporate income taxes.”).
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tax costs are an area where a tradeoff is recognized between the “Coase
Theorem,”79 transaction costs,80 and regulatory costs.81
It is difficult to accurately measure the empirical effects of tax changes
on corporate and financial decision-making.82  Doidge and Dyck note,
“Tax policy changes are limited because such changes are rarely significant
or separable from other changes and are often widely anticipated.  Conse-
quently, results may not be economically significant or may be open to
multiple interpretations.”83  Despite this uncertainty, the two case studies
that follow give support to the notion that tax changes can significantly
influence corporate decision-making, often resulting in unintended conse-
quences that neutralize the intended impact of the reform in question.
C. Case Study 1: Income Repatriation & the Homeland Investment Act
The Homeland Investment Act (“HIA”) was passed in 2004 as part of
the larger American Jobs Creation Act of 200484 (“AJCA”)—a reform
that, among other things, changed incentives on export taxes and interest
expense allocation policies and introduced various incentives for domestic
business and agricultural production.  Dharmapala, Foley, and Forbes
(“Dharmapala”) suggest that the HIA (which is officially known as Section
422: Incentives to Reinvest Foreign Earnings in the United States)85 was
designed to encourage American companies, who earned income abroad,
to bring those earnings back into the U.S. so that the income could be
reinvested domestically.86  To generate this result, the HIA allowed for a
79. The Coase Theorem refers to a legal and economic theory, developed by Ronald
Coase, whereby, in the absence of externalities and transaction costs, parties will negotiate to
achieve an optimal (efficient) outcome regardless of how property rights are initially allo-
cated. See generally Barbara White, Coase and the Courts: Economics for the Common Man,
72 IOWA L. REV. 577 (1987).
80. See generally R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
81. See generally Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227 (2010).
82. Craig Doidge & Alexander Dyck, Taxes and Corporate Policies: Evidence from a
Quasi Natural Experiment, 70 J. FIN. 45, 45 (2015).
83. Id.
84. See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418
(2004).
85. Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 422, 118 Stat. 1418 (2004).
86. See Dhammika Dharmapala, C. Fritz Foley & Kristin J. Forbes, Watch What I Do,
Not What I Say: The Unintended Consequences of the Homeland Investment Act, 66 J. FIN.
753, 761 (2011). See also id. at 759-60 (“These rules create incentives and opportunities for
firms to reduce their tax obligations and suggest that certain kinds of firms are most likely to
benefit from a tax holiday. Desai, Foley, and Hines (2007) show that because the tax costs of
repatriations are higher for firms that operate abroad in low tax jurisdictions, such firms have
lower repatriations. Another common strategy to avoid U.S. repatriation taxes involves the
indirect ownership of foreign affiliates, either through holding companies or through affili-
ates in tax havens that do not impose repatriation taxes. Under these kinds of ownership
arrangements, earnings do not need to be returned to the U.S. before they are invested else-
where around the world, thereby avoiding U.S. repatriation taxes. Altshuler and Grubert
(2003) and Desai, Foley, and Hines (2003) illustrate that holding company structures have
Fall 2017] Trump’s “Big-League” Tax Reform 17
tax holiday to firms repatriating foreign earnings provided the funds were
used for certain prescribed activities, including “hiring and training domes-
tic workers, domestic infrastructure and capital investments, R&D . . . .”87
Using data on repatriations from 1996 to 2005 obtained from the U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis, CompuStat, and ExecuComp, Dharmapala
presented evidence showing that despite the HIA’s strong political sup-
port—proponents suggested that it would provide internal financial relief
to firms to fund R&D, investment projects, M&A activity, and lower
debt—domestic investment did not rise as a result of the tax break.88  In
fact, domestic investment failed to rise despite survey answers and public
statements indicating repatriated funds would be used for domestic pur-
poses from firms that directly lobbied for the Act and that were under
“financial constraints.”89  Dharmpala suggests that their study gives “an
opportunity to test several hypotheses about financial constraints, corpo-
rate governance, and the effectiveness of government regulations that aim
to incentivize certain forms of corporate spending.”90
Dharmpala also notes that the HIA was promoted with an incorrect
assumption: that companies would access financial foreign resources to
eliminate “financial constraints” in the United States.91  As such, the HIA
these effects, and Desai, Foley, and Hines (2006) show that affiliates in tax havens are instru-
mental in facilitating deferral of U.S. taxes, whether or not they are classified as holding
companies. The evidence therefore suggests that firms that face low tax rates abroad and
firms that make use of holding company structures or tax haven affiliates have the most to
gain from a tax holiday on repatriations.”).
87. Id. at 761 (“U.S. repatriations only qualified for this tax holiday if they met several
criteria. Most relevant to the analysis in this paper, repatriations had to be used for certain
domestic activities in accordance with a domestic investment plan in order to qualify for the
tax holiday. Investments that were permitted uses for the repatriated funds included: hiring
and training domestic workers, domestic infrastructure and capital investments, R&D, finan-
cial stabilization (including debt repayment) for the purposes of U.S. job retention or crea-
tion, and certain acquisitions of business entities with U.S. assets. Uses that were explicitly
not permitted for repatriations under the tax holiday were: executive compensation, in-
tercompany transactions, dividends and other shareholder distributions, stock redemptions,
portfolio investments, debt instruments, and tax payments.”).
88. Id. at 753-54 (“Figure 1 presents aggregate data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis and shows that repatriations increased from an average of $62 billion per 2000 to
2004 to $299 billion in 2005 under the tax holiday. After repatriations fell back to $102
billion.”).
89. Id. at 753.
90. Id. at 754.
91. Id. at 754-55 (“The framers of the Act justified the tax holiday based on the pre-
mise that these firms’ domestic operations were financially constrained. If this were true,
repatriated cash could be invested in U.S. projects that had a positive value for the firm
based on the temporarily lower cost of internal capital but that were not profitable at the
higher cost of external finance. Financially constrained firms that did not currently have any
attractive investment projects could also use the repatriations to pay down debt or increase
cash reserves in order to reduce or eliminate future financing constraints. Studying firms’
responses to the HIA shows whether the reduced tax costs of accessing internal funds
spurred domestic activity or affected debt levels, shedding light on the role of financial con-
straints.”). See also id. at 756 (“The regression results and additional evidence in this paper
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did not produce the intended results.  The authors note, “The overall ef-
fect of what firms did differed from what their public statements indicated
they would do and from what the regulations ostensibly intended.”92  In
other words, the companies used the money for other purposes, not for
domestic U.S. investments.
The Dharmapala study provides three conclusions that are relevant to
an analysis of the Trump tax reform.  First, the underlying motivations and
assumptions surrounding the enactment of the HIA were flawed.  Specifi-
cally, the authors note that “the domestic operations of U.S. multination-
als were not financially constrained at the time of the Act.”  The authors
also state, “The ability to access an internal source of capital at a lower
cost did not boost domestic investment, domestic employment, or
R&D.”93 Second, the authors suggest that “agency problems” and poor
governance did not widely affect U.S. multinationals.94  Finally, because of
the “fungibility of money”—in other words, the way that money is easily
substituted and redirected—the regulations pursuant to the HIA, designed
to influence corporate financial policy, were ultimately less effective.95
are inconsistent with the claim that the domestic operations of MNEs were financially con-
strained and that the tax holiday spurred U.S. job creation or investment for firms that repa-
triated. More specifically, higher levels of repatriations were not associated with increased
domestic capital expenditures, increased domestic employment compensation, increased
R&D expenditures, or reduced debt levels. These results hold not only for the full sample of
firms, but also for subsamples of firms that appeared to be financially constrained or that
lobbied for the Act.”).
92. Id. at 783.
93. Id. at 782 (“Statements by Congressmen and lobbyists indicate that they believed
that reducing repatriation taxes would increase the domestic activities of U.S. MNEs. This
paper’s results clearly show that the tax holiday did not have this effect. Even firms that
showed some evidence of being financially constrained or that explicitly lobbied for the tax
holiday did not increase domestic investment, domestic employment, or R&D. Moreover,
around the time of the HIA, repatriations were positively associated with parents sending
capital to their foreign affiliates, suggesting that parent companies were round tripping capi-
tal in order to repatriate it at the lower tax rate. This behavior is also inconsistent with the
view that parent operations were financially constrained.”).
94. Id. (“If U.S. multinationals had serious agency problems, then managers would
have been likely to respond to the ability to access cash at a lower cost under the HIA in
ways that maximized their private return instead of shareholder value. For example, manag-
ers may have increased their own compensation or engaged in empire building through ac-
quisitions or investment. Managers might also have paid down debt in order to reduce future
constraints on their operations by reducing their fixed obligations. The results indicate that
increases in repatriations under the HIA did not have these effects. Instead, the estimates
imply that every extra dollar of repatriated cash was associated with an increase of $0.60-
$0.92 in payouts to shareholders, largely in the form of share repurchases. Although this
response was concentrated among firms characterized by stronger corporate governance, the
results indicate that agency problems were not significant, on average, in the full sample of
firms.”).
95. Id. (“A key goal of the legislation was to increase investment and employment in
the U.S. The HIA included specific guidelines on how cash repatriated at the lower tax rate
could be used in order to promote this goal. This paper clearly shows, however, that these
guidelines were ineffective in getting repatriating firms to increase their domestic
activities.”).
Fall 2017] Trump’s “Big-League” Tax Reform 19
D. Case Study 2: Canadian Income Trusts, Tax Fairness Plan, 2006
A recent Canadian study by Craig Doidge and Alexander Dyck pro-
vides strong support—using a “quasi natural experiment” of the unantici-
pated changes to the way that income trusts were taxed in Canada96—for
the validity of the MMT and for the proposition that business managers in
the face of significant tax reform will adopt new policies and seek out tax
shelters to obtain more favorable treatment.97 In their study, the authors
produce “statistically and economically significant” evidence on the im-
pact of taxes on business decision-making.98
On October 31, 2006, after the close of markets, the federal govern-
ment of Canada enacted legislative measures99 that effectively changed
the way that income trusts were taxed. These measures eliminated trusts’
previous tax advantages and implemented a new regime (labeled a “Tax
Fairness Plan” (“TFP”)).  In the TFP, new trusts would be taxed similarly
to corporations, allowing a transition window of four years for existing
trusts to comply.100  The change was largely unanticipated by the markets,
and it resulted in a significant price response.101  The study shows how
unexpected tax reforms can result in measured changes to “corporate
policies.”102
Doidge and Dyck observed that the affected trusts (which included nu-
merous publicly traded entities) could access “tax shields” to offset the
TFP.103  The study also examined the subject of leverage.  It showed how
96. See Doidge & Dyck, supra note 82, at 46 (“Unlike many tax policy changes ana-
lyzed in prior literature (e.g. the Tax Reform Act of 1986), the tax change we exploit was
largely unanticipated, dramatic (the corporate tax rate increased from 0% to 31.5%), and
was not contaminated by other information or policy changes.”).
97. See Id. at 48.
98. See Id. at 46.
99. See Archived-Canada’s New Government Announces Tax Fairness Plan, DEP’T OF
FIN., GOV’T OF CANADA, https://www.fin.gc.ca/n06/06-061-eng.asp (last visited Feb. 1 2017).
100. See Doidge & Dyck, supra note 82, at 46. See also id. at 53 (“[K]ey feature of the
TFP was new tax on distributions made by certain publicly traded flow-through entities, al-
though REITs were excluded. The tax rate on trust distributions was equivalent to the rate
paid by corporations.”).
101. Doidge & Dyck, supra note 82, at 46. See also id. at 48 (“Equity values f[ell] by
14% over the shortest meaningful event window and 19% over a longer window.”).
102. See Doidge & Dyck, supra note 82, at 46.
103. See Doidge & Dyck, supra note 82, at 48. See also id. at 69 (“Perhaps most interest-
ing are the investment (capital expenditures/lagged total assets) results in models (7) and (8).
Given the tax rules for trusts, financing investment with internal funds was costly. Therefore,
to the extent that external finance is costly, the tax incentives could discourage investment
for trusts. In both the parsimonious specification and the one that controls for lagged growth
opportunities, cash flow, leverage, and industry investment, we find that firms invest signifi-
cantly less after they convert to trust status. If firms invested at optimal levels prior to con-
verting to trust status, the results suggest that they made a considerable compromise to a
fundamental corporate policy to access the tax benefit.”) (noting that personal taxes affect
the value of tax shields); id. at 84, (“We find that personal taxes affect the value of tax shields
and that tax shields are worth more for firms that have a low tax investor clientele that is
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leverage changed in accordance with the modifications to tax incentives.
The authors note, “Prior to the TFP, when debt had no value as a tax
shield, trusts had lower leverage than when they were organized as
corporates.  With the loss of the trust tax shield (due to the TFP), trusts
could increase leverage to create an alternate source of tax shields.”104
Additionally, Doidge and Dyck’s study established that firms will alter
their levels of debt in response to new tax measures.  Specifically, Cana-
dian income trusts sought to “increase leverage” to create new “tax
shields” to replace those eliminated by the TFP.105  Further, the study il-
lustrated that tax changes affect a firm’s investment behavior,106 as well as
their payout ratios and “cash holdings.”107  In addition, the authors pre-
most hard hit by the tax. While these results are based on Canadian data, they likely have
broader significance as the Canadian tax system has similarities to that of the United States,
for instance, a degree of double taxation of corporate income and higher personal taxes on
interest compared to equity income.”).
104. Doidge & Dyck, supra note 82, at 56.
105. Doidge & Dyck, supra note 82, at 84 (“Consistent with the tax interpretation of
the event study, we find that firms decreased their leverage after becoming a trust and in-
creased it after the TFP, providing them with additional tax shields when the trust tax shield
expired in 2011. To access the tax benefit, firms made accommodative changes to other cor-
porate policies such as payout, cash holdings, and investment after becoming a trust. These
changes were reversed after the TFP.”). See also id. at 48 (discussing the effect on leverage
prior to the enactment of the TFP, “Prior to TFP, when debt had no value as a tax shield,
trusts had lower leverage than when they were organized as corporates. With the loss of the
trust tax shield due to the TFP, trusts could increase leverage to create an alternate source of
tax shields. . . . After controlling for observable and unobservable firm characteristics, plus
industry and year effects, we find that trusts increased their leverage by six percentage points
relative to corporates, an economically significant change given that the average debt to
value ratio was about 20% in 2006.”).
106. Doidge & Dyck, supra note 82, at 49 (“To fully capture the tax benefits of the trust
structure, trusts had to pay out all earnings. This made it costly to build up cash holdings and
to use these holdings to finance investment. Therefore, trusts had a tax incentive to increase
payout and decrease cash holdings, and, to the extent that external finance is costly, they had
a disincentive to invest. The evidence is consistent with these predictions. Prior to the TFP,
trusts had higher payout and lower cash holdings than when they were organized as
corporates. After the TFP, they reversed these changes by reducing payout and increasing
cash holdings. More interesting are the results for investment. In frictionless markets, Modi-
gliani and Miller (1958) show that investment policy determines value. Our results suggest
that trusts altered their investment policy in response to tax incentives. In the pre-TFP pe-
riod, trusts’ investment in fixed assets was significantly lower than when they were
corporates. In the post-TFP period, trusts significantly increased their investment relative to
corporates. The fact that trusts altered their investment decisions to access a tax benefit sig-
nals the power of tax incentives to affect corporate policies.”).
107. Id. at 76 (“The evidence in this section shows that there were significant changes in
payout, cash holdings, and investment after the TFP. Combined with the evidence in Section
V.A, the simplest interpretation is that firms were willing to make substantial accommoda-
tive changes to these policies to access the tax benefit but reversed them when the tax benefit
was lost. Most interesting are the investment results as investment policy is central to value
creation.”).
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dicted that the tax reform would have an impact on acquisitions.108  The
evidence from the study suggests that firms changed their “corporate poli-
cies” in response to tax measures (in seeking out “tax shields”) or in light
of tax incentives to obtain the most favorable result.109  Additionally, this
observation is supported by a large body of academic literature on the
impact of tax on corporate debt ratios.110  In all, the tax reform to Cana-
dian income trusts in 2006 threatened “financing efficiencies.”111
108. Id. at 49 (“Given the tax advantage of the trust structure prior to the TFP, we
predict that trusts were more likely to be acquirers and less likely to be targets compared to
corporates. Similarly, with the loss of the tax advantage due to the TFP, we predict that trusts
were more likely to be acquired after the TFP as takeovers are one channel that can change
organizational form and potentially offer more tax shields. The results are consistent with
these predictions.”).
109. Doidge & Dyck, supra note 82, at 49. See also id. at 84-85 (“We find that this
principle also applies when the tax savings opportunity is an organizational form choice. By
organizing themselves as trusts, firms could avoid paying corporate taxes. In the absence of
frictions and other costs associated with being a trust, the tax benefit could increase value by
a maximum of 31.5%. However, trusts had to make accommodative changes to a number of
corporate policies to access the tax benefit. For example, our evidence suggests that trusts
made potentially inefficient and costly changes to their investment policies. As a result, the
net tax benefit of being a trust was likely worth less than the potential gross benefit of 31.5%.
While we cannot quantify the exact magnitude of this difference, the idea that firms are
willing to make costly changes to important policies to gain preferential tax treatment is
consistent with all our other evidence that suggests taxes have an important impact on corpo-
rate decision-making.”).
110. See generally Michael Bradley, Gregg Jarrell & E. Han Kim, On The Existence of
an Optimal Capital Structure: Theory and Evidence, 39 J. FIN. 857, 857-78 (1984); John Gra-
ham, Michael Lemmon & James Schallheim, Debt, Leases, Taxes and the Endogeneity of
Corporate Tax Status, 53 J. FIN. 131, 131-62 (1998); John Graham, Debt and the Marginal Tax
Rate, 41 J. FIN. ECON. 41, 41-74 (1996); John Graham, Do Personal Taxes Affect Corporate
Financing Decisions?, 73 J. PUB. ECON. 147, 147-85 (1999); Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason, Do
Taxes Affect Corporate Financing Decisions? 45 J. FIN. 1471, 1471-93 (1990); Arthur
Korteweg, The Net Benefits to Leverage, 65 J. FIN. 2137, 2137-70 (2010).
111. See Benjamin Alarie & Edward M. Iacobucci, Tax Policy, Capital Structure and
Income Trusts, 45 CAN. BUS. L.J. 1, 19 (2007) (“A complete efficiency analysis of the recently
announced tax. Some observations, however, follow directly from the preceding analysis.
More consistent tax treatment of businesses on the basis of underlying business characteris-
tics will obviously result in less tax-driven variation in the choice of organizational form. To
the extent that tax considerations have driven the adoption of potentially inappropriate
forms, the reforms are a welcome development. On the other hand, there will also be a loss
associated with this more consistent tax treatment of income trusts and corporations that is
widely ignored. Eliminating the differential tax treatment of income trusts and corporations
will mean that the commitment of income trusts to pay out cash will no longer be firmer than
that of a corporation with a high dividend policy (and will not be as firm as an obligation to
pay interest on arm’s length debt). That is, corporate finance considerations, like the agency
costs of debt and bankruptcy costs, explain why income trusts were key in allowing busi-
nesses to maximize the tax advantages of debt, while tax considerations help to explain the
corporate finance attractions of the income trust. Reform jeopardizes these potential financ-
ing efficiencies.”).
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E. Implications for Trump Tax Reform
Since the impact of tax reform is difficult to measure and anticipate,
some tax experts advocate against dramatic measures.112  Consequently,
results of tax reform may be “open to multiple interpretations.”113  Based
on the above case studies and corporate finance theories, however, several
implications can be identified in regards to the Trump tax reforms.  This
Section will discuss these implications as they apply to the specific tax re-
forms of reducing corporate tax rates, removing deductions for interest on
debt, changing the capital expenditure rules, and reforming corporate re-
patriation measures.
A reduction in corporate tax rates (especially when combined with a
repatriation holiday, as discussed below) would, on its face, infer an influx
in domestic cash and investment.  Given the Dharmapala study, however,
the effect on domestic investment is not a certainty.  Another reform is a
limit on the business deductibility of debt interest payments (to be capped
at thirty percent of taxable income).  The deductibility of interest on cor-
porate debt is a topic that has been debated for many years.  It has been
the source of “significant conceptual and operational problems for the fed-
eral tax on corporate income throughout its history.”114  Interest deduct-
ibility originated in 1918 as a measure (initially temporarily) to equalize
the effect of the “excess profits tax” of World War I.115  Proponents of
112. See generally Alan Auerbach, Corporate Restructuring: Tax Incentives and Options
for Corporate Tax Reform, 43 TAX LAW. 663, 691 (1990) (“The most significant problem
confronting whether and how to reform the tax treatment of corporate debt and equity is
understanding the impact of taxation on corporate financial policy. There is little evidence to
support the view that changes in the tax environment have spurred the borrowing boom of
the past few years. While the tax advantages of debt have increased for some equity holders,
they have decreased for others. The increased incidence of tax losses has contributed further
to a decline in the value of interest deductions overall. The rise in equity retirements appears
to be associated with conversions of equity into debt much more than with a reduction in
dividends. The economists’ ‘dividend puzzle’ remains largely intact. But the ability to redeem
equity without incurring the tax cost of dividends does little to explain why net equity retire-
ments have increased, especially when favorable tax treatment also would have been availa-
ble to future distributions from the retired equity. Given this uncertainty, we should tread
carefully toward significant changes in corporate taxation. Rationalizing the treatment of
debt and equity is a sufficiently desirable objective that legislation to accomplish it should be
considered, even if recent changes in corporate financial policy are not tax-driven. Nonethe-
less, available alternatives do have their drawbacks, offering either revenue losing windfalls
or new complications and distortions. These costs must be measured against the costs of
maintaining the current system, regardless of how difficult they are to estimate.”).
113. See Doidge & Dyck, supra note 82, at 45.
114. Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The Corporate Interest Deduction: A Policy Evaluation, 83
YALE L.J. 1585, 1585 (1973).
115. Id. at 1586 (“When the excess profits tax was repealed in 1921, the full interest
deduction was retained as part of, the corporate income tax, without any explanation by
Congress in the legislative history.”).
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interest deductibility cite the concept of “net income” as a basis for its
existence, stating that interest is an “expense” like rent or cost of goods.116
Those who oppose interest deductibility, however, state that a reduc-
tion in the cost of debt will lead to more leverage, which in turn will in-
crease “volatility,” “distress costs,” and “externalities.”117  The deduction
is said to be an “inefficient unneutrality”118 that is not critical in “defining
the concept of corporate income”119 in the tax system.  Additionally, the
deduction has been the subject of extensive litigation.120  Setting limits on
the deductibility of interest, based on an application of the MMT, would
infer a reduction in the desirability of leverage by firms.121  Knoll has sug-
gested that this is a good thing and that it will lead to enhanced innovation
by growth-oriented firms.122  Also, less debt may help to moderate exces-
sive risk.123  This point is debatable, however, and it has been argued by
Netter that “debt has an important function in controlling management
from engaging in non-value maximizing strategies.”124  Levmore also
claims that tax laws already adopt a “Modigliani-Miller perspective” and
that they motivate companies to focus on “real variables,” making exces-
sive debt loads undesirable.125  For these reasons, the tax effect on debt
loads may be insignificant.
116. Id. at 1589 (“Interest payments are as much expenses of producing income as are
rent, wages, and the cost of supplies or productive assets; thus denying deductibility would
make the tax pro tanto a levy on gross income. Dividends, on the other hand, are seen as a
division of the profits of the enterprise, and not an expense of doing business. This distinction
is sometimes supported by an analogy between corporate and non-corporate business
enterprises.”).
117. See Joseph B. Allen, Seeking True Financial Reform: Ending the Debt-Equity Dis-
tinction, 3 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 243, 243-68 (2012).
118. Warren, supra note 114, at 1606.
119. See generally id. at 1605.
120. See id. at 1605.
121. See Michael S. Knoll, Taxing Prometheus: How The Corporate Interest Deduction
Discourages Innovation and Risk-Taking, 38 VILL. L. REV. 1461, 1516 (1993) (“Because cur-
rent tax law allows corporations to deduct interest but not dividends and retained earnings,
debt financing is taxed more favorably than is equity financing. Thus; the existing tax law
encourages corporations to increase leverage. However, not all corporations can increase
leverage as easily. Because high-risk, high-growth projects employing intangible assets can-
not support as much leverage as can low-risk, low-growth projects employing tangible assets,
the existing corporate tax law discourages investment in the former in favor of investment in
the latter. This misallocates capital within the corporate sector and discourages investment in
precisely those industries and activities that many commentators consider to be critical to the
economic future of the United States.”).
122. See id.
123. See Tim Edgar, Financial Instability, Tax Policy, and the Tax Expenditure Concept,
63 SMU L. REV. 969, 1031 (2010).
124. See Jeffry Netter, Ending the Interest Deductibility of Debt Used to Finance Take-
overs is Still a Bad Idea: The Empirical Evidence on Takeovers, Restrictions on Takeovers,
and Restrictions on Deductibility of Interest, 15 J. CORP. L. 219, 222 (1989).
125. See Saul Levmore, The Positive Role of Tax Law in Corporate and Capital Mar-
kets, 12 J. CORP. L. 483, 490 (1986) (“Thus, the law can be described as adopting a Modi-
24 Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review [Vol. 7:1
As discussed by Warren, with a limitation of interest deductibility,
firms could “shift the focus of tax minimization by encouraging alterna-
tives to long-term indebtedness, such as leasing and short term borrow-
ing.”126  Also, firms may choose not to engage in certain investment
projects that will become unprofitable given the limits of the interest de-
duction.127  As such, this loss of investment would have a negative impact
on the domestic economy.  On the other hand, a modified solution would
be to allow for dividend payment deductions; however, for several rea-
sons, this is unlikely to be enacted.128  Such measures could also create
“moral hazard” for corporate managers.129
Trump’s reforms also change the way that capital investments are de-
ductible.  Large capital investments (under certain parameters) would be
completely deductible by businesses in the year they are made (hereinafter
“the large capital investment expense”) rather than amortized over time.
If a large capital project is deductible in the year the expense is incurred,
this tax incentive may motivate firms to increase their debt ratios to lever-
age acquisitions or new capital investments and, therefore, obtain more
favorable tax shields through the full deductibility of the investment.
Problematically, increased leverage will increase the chance of a firm go-
ing bankrupt, which given the MMT, may decrease its value.130
Moreover, companies under significant debt burdens could end up in a
worse financial position with the new limitations on debt interest deduct-
ibility.131  Given the MMT, it is reasonable to anticipate that some compa-
nies may seek tax jurisdictions where interest on corporate debt is fully
deductible.  Similarly, these companies may reasonably hold on to cash
resources and may wait to make capital investments until after the reforms
are passed, impacting the short-term use of their funds.132  The large capi-
tal investment expense will not benefit all companies equally because cer-
gliani-Miller perspective and encouraging managers to focus on real, rather than financial,
variables. The positive effect of tax law in this setting can be stated even more strongly. One
can view the Code as recognizing that excessive-debt (compared to agency cost considera-
tions alone) will be encouraged by the combined presence of tax-exempt investors and the
interest expense deduction. The task, in support of efficient corporate and capital markets (in
agency cost, or real terms), is to discourage debt, and the rules governing midstream distribu-
tions of debt, whether in redemption, reorganization, or dividend distribution, accomplish
just that by refusing non-recognition treatment. The tax laws governing exchanges involving
debt, thus, can be deemed to discourage both excessive debt financing and irrelevant or even
destructive ‘financial fiddling’ by managers with the capital structure of the ongoing
corporation.”).
126. Warren, supra note 114, at 1610.
127. See id. at 1615.
128. Id. at 1609.
129. See Allen, supra note 117, at 254.
130. See generally Stephanie Ben-Ishai, Debt or Equity? A Puzzle For Canadian Bank-
ruptcy Law, 53 CAN. BUS. L.J. 416, 416 (2012).
131. See Dan McCrum & Eric Platt, Trump Corporate Tax Plan May Yet Reshape the
World for Investors, FIN. TIMES (February 1, 2017); see also Warren, supra note 114, at 1618.
132. McCrum & Platt, supra note 131.
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tain public utility companies are limited in “the amount of profit they are
allowed to make.133  Lawrence Summers has suggested that the combined
effect of the business rate reduction, the reduction of interest deductibility,
and the large capital investment expense could increase “inequality.”134
Summers further notes that the interest deductibility rules for banks and
business organizations that do not operate as corporations (e.g. partner-
ships) are uncertain.135  Additionally, Howard Gleckman demonstrates
that tax cuts could have a negative effect on the national deficit.136
Another of Trump’s reforms introduces a “one-time” tax repatriation
holiday.  This tax holiday would enable U.S. firms to repatriate funds held
overseas with only a 15.5 percent payment (as opposed to the current 35
percent rate) on cash reserves and an 8 percent payment on equipment.
Repatriation holidays are not a new initiative, and as previously identified
in the Dharmapala study, domestic investments do not necessarily increase
when such repatriation tax incentives are introduced.  As a result, if a U.S.
corporation becomes more successful and more competitive globally, one
cannot predict a corresponding increase in capital investments and em-
ployment in America.137  In fact, a study by Brennan—which examined
the “long-term effects” of the 2004 U.S. repatriation holiday—concluded
that although there was a short term influx of cash returned to the U.S.
pursuant to the holiday, the government’s efforts were ultimately a “net
failure.”  Brennan reached this conclusion because repatriated funds were
“substantially offset” by increased amounts of foreign profits invested
abroad.138  Thus, when changing tax regimes, lawmakers need to be sensi-
tive to both the short-term implications and the long-term consequences
133. Id.
134. Summers, supra note 24 (“[P]ensions, 401(k)s, life insurance, holdings by foreign-
ers and the like render most individual capital income-tax free, where the remainder is taxed
at highly preferential capital gains and dividend rates, and where the estate tax is easily
avoided and likely to be eliminated.”).
135. Lawrence Summers, US Tax Reforms Vital but Donald Trump’s Plan is Flawed,
FIN. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/7e5900ec-d401-11e6-b06b-680c49b4b
4c0.
136. See Howard Gleckman, Bet on a Tax Cut, Not a Tax Reform, THE HILL (February
3, 2017), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/economy-budget/317123-bet-on-a-tax-cut-not-
tax-reform.
137. See generally Kimberly A. Clausing, The Tax Policy Briefing Book: International
Taxation, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Dec. 17, 2007), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book.
138. See Thomas J. Brennan, What Happens After A Holiday? Long-Term Effects Of
The Repatriation Provision of the AJCA, 5 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 2 (2010) (“These find-
ings help elucidate the full effect of the AJCA tax holiday and serve as a basis for evaluating
whether the law achieved desired policy goals. Assuming that a return of foreign earnings to
the United States was the sole policy goal, the AJCA was unarguably a short-term success, as
substantial amounts of cash were returned to U.S. parent corporations during the window
permitted by § 965.9. However, this short-term success must be weighed against the accom-
panying long-term effects. This Article shows that since the holiday window, there has been a
dramatic increase in the rate at which firms add to their stockpile of foreign earnings kept
overseas. The long-term result has been an aggregate increase in new foreign earnings added
to the overseas stockpile that is greater than the amount of funds repatriated pursuant to the
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that occur after firms have adjusted their policies to adapt to the new
regime.139
At the heart of the repatriation reform is a larger question: what mea-
sures (including taxation) can the U.S. government use to keep companies
and their profits from moving overseas altogether?  An efficient outcome
to this problem is challenging given the complexity of the Internal Reve-
nue Code and given the often times conflicting tax policy objectives of
revenue, redistribution, and equality.140  Several recent studies have,
nonetheless, addressed this question.  These studies have also sought to
determine the most effective means of repatriating foreign income earned
abroad by U.S. multinational companies.141  Such tax reforms start by ad-
holiday. From this perspective, it seems that the AJCA may have been a net failure in achiev-
ing the policy goal of returning foreign earnings to the United States.”).
139. See id. at 17 (“The pattern of behavior exhibited by firms increasing permanently
reinvested foreign earnings may well have been brought about by the AJCA tax holiday. An
intended consequence of the holiday was to cause substantial amounts of permanently rein-
vested foreign earnings to be returned to the United States. A collateral consequence of
substantial proportions, however, is the conditioning of firms to expect future such holidays
and to arrange their affairs accordingly. In this way, the AJCA holiday may have been re-
sponsible for the long-term classification of an increased fraction of foreign earnings being
labeled as permanently reinvested overseas and also for a long-term increase in the amount
of earnings generation that firms carry out overseas rather than in the United States. The
findings of this Article are broadly consistent with changes in firm behavior that will allow
firms to take the fullest advantage of an anticipated future tax holiday. However, the findings
demonstrate only statistical correlation and not causation, and it is possible, for example, that
other intervening events or changes over time may have caused the observed differences in
firm behavior rather than simply the fact of the AJCA tax holiday. Nevertheless, the changes
in patterns demonstrated by the methods of this article are sufficiently substantial in terms of
dollar magnitude and statistical significance that they provide strong evidence of a condi-
tioned behavioral change in firms created by the AJCA tax holiday. These findings are im-
portant not only for evaluating the long-term impact of the AJCA tax holiday, but also for
evaluating the merits of other proposed temporary holidays and amnesties, both in the arena
of permanently reinvested foreign earnings and in other areas that allow for the possibility of
a second holiday at some future point. Lawmakers must exercise care in weighing not only
the short-term intended consequences but also the long-term behavioral changes induced by
the prospect of future holidays. In the case of the AJCA tax holiday, these long-term effects
were substantial and perhaps outweighed the short-term benefits, resulting in a net policy
failure, at least to the extent that the policy goal was the long-term net return of foreign
earnings to the United States.”).
140. See generally Edward Yorio, Federal Income Tax Rulemaking: An Economic Ap-
proach, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 51 (1982); Terrance O’Reilly, Principles of Efficient Tax
Law: Apocrypha, 27 VA. TAX REV. 583 (2008); Adam Chodorow, Economic Analysis in Judi-
cial Decision Making – An Assessment Based on Judge Posner’s Tax Decisions, 25 VA. TAX
REV. 67 (2005); Daniel Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation,
90 MICH. L. REV. 895 (1992); and Leo Martinez, Tax Collection and Populist Rhetoric: Shift-
ing the Burden of Proof in Tax Cases, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 239 (1988).
141. See e.g., Joseph McWeeney, Cat and Mouse – How Can The U.S. Government
Keep American Companies in America?, 14 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 357 (2016); Joshua
Simpson, Analyzing Corporate Inversions and Proposed Changes To The Repatriation Rule,
68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 673 (2013); Robert Bloink, Is United States Corporate Tax
Policy Outsourcing America? A Critical Analysis Of The Proposed Tax Holiday For Trapped
CFC Earnings, 56 VILL. L. REV. 833 (2012).
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dressing the root of the problem, which Joseph Simpson describes as “high
U.S. tax rates, a global system of taxation, and high regulatory costs.”142
Reflecting these studies, available academic literature cites alternative
measures to repatriation holidays, such as: a lowering of the corporate
rate143 (which has been implemented by the Trump reforms), adopting a
national retail sales tax,144 a combined wealth and consumption tax,145
adopting a territorial or hybrid-territorial system of taxation (like that of
142. Simpson, supra note 141, at 716.
143. See McWeeney, supra note 141, at 383-84; see also Simpson, supra note 141, at 718-
20, (“[T]he United States could follow Canada’s lead and lower its corporate tax rates. Ca-
nada dropped its corporate tax rates from 38% to 15% over the last thirty-two years, with tax
revenues fluctuating based on economic growth and not declining with tax rates. In fact,
Canada collects 1.9% of GDP in corporate tax revenues with a 15% rate, while the United
States only collects 1.6% of GDP with a 35% corporate tax rate. U.S. marginal tax rates are
the highest in the OECD. Although some may argue that, due to the effect of credits and
deductions, effective tax rates in the United States are competitive internationally even
though United States’ marginal tax rates are not, it is marginal tax rates that companies use
to make investment decisions. These investment decisions are often new corporate projects,
which may require the creation of new jobs. High corporate tax rates have been shown to
increase the size of the informal economy and have large adverse effects on investment, for-
eign direct investment, and entrepreneurship. Even President Obama’s Economic Recovery
Advisory Board stated that ‘[t]he high effective tax rates that apply to corporate investments
result in significant economic distortions and a lower tax rate on corporate investments
would result in desirable changes in a number of areas.’ For instance, lowering the U.S. cor-
porate tax rate could increase the competitiveness of the United States in attracting business
activity. Many proposals suggest lowering tax rates in a revenue-neutral fashion by broaden-
ing the corporate tax base. There are also many arguments that this is a fair outcome, one
being that shareholders are already taxed on the income received from corporations. As
lower rates also have the advantage of decreasing the incentive for corporations to shift in-
come abroad, they could mitigate the problems created by a shift towards a territorial tax
system. Income shifting was estimated to cost the U.S. government $90 billion in 2008 alone,
or 30% of corporate tax revenues. Thus, ideally a territorial tax system with lower tax rates
would be implemented to enhance U.S. competitiveness and support growth, as OECD anal-
ysis has found that ‘corporate taxes are the most harmful type of tax for economic growth.”)
(citations omitted).
144. See generally Bruce W. Bennett, Cashing In or Cashing Out? The Fair Tax Act of
1999, 27 J. LEGIS. 69 (2001).
145. See generally Beverly I. Moran, Capitalism and the Tax System: A Search For So-
cial Justice, 61 SMU L. REV. 337 (2008).
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Germany or Japan),146 a flat tax regime,147 and also streamlining
regulations.148
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A BORDER ADJUSTMENT TAX
A. The Border Adjustment Tax and Its Potential Economic Impact
As previously discussed in Section I, during the election campaign
there were several discussions of changes to import and export taxation
under a policy referred to as a “Border Adjustment Tax” (“BAT”).  This
BAT would allow exporters to exclude revenue from exports when they
were calculating their total taxable income.  Additionally, companies
would not be able to deduct the cost of imports that they purchased.  This
reform would attempt to remedy the problem presented by the current tax
regime, which discourages U.S. companies from investing at home the
profits they make abroad.149  The Trump administration believed the BAT
would generate significant revenue; however, not all commentators
agreed.150  Alan Reynolds at the CATO Institute, for example, considered
146. See McWeeney, supra note 141, at 385, (“Finally, one of the greatest incentives a
company possesses to invert is created by the repatriation tax that is levied on foreign income
that is brought into the U.S. A territorial system would eliminate the need for this type of
tax. A repatriation tax seems to be an antiquated instrument used during a time when global
business was less feasible. I believe that technology has broken down many of the burdens
bestowed upon global business and it is in our best interest to knock down any other barriers
to creating a truly global marketplace. Additionally, a repatriation tax causes a phenomenon
known as ‘trapped income’. In 2015, the amount of ‘trapped’ income was estimated to be $2.6
trillion. Adopting a territorial tax system would allow the corporate tax rate to stay where it’s
encouraging U.S. companies to stay at home, while putting their best foot forward abroad.
The greatest risk with a territorial system is its vulnerability to tax avoidance schemes like
shifting income abroad to make it look as if profits were being earned in a foreign domicile.
Countries like Germany and Japan have found success with a hybrid territorial system which
incorporates anti-abuse provisions such as: taxing at least a fixed percentage of foreign earn-
ings and limiting companies’ ability to channel income to subsidiaries in low-tax countries.”)
(citations omitted); see also Simpson, supra note 141, at 717-18.
147. See generally John T. Plecnik, The New Flat Tax: A Modest Proposal For a Consti-
tutionally Apportioned Wealth Tax, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 483 (2014).
148. Simpson, supra note 141, at 720 (“Another suggested alternative is to streamline
U.S. regulations, which would support territorial taxation and lower tax rates in reducing the
incentive for corporate inversions. Some targets for modification may include SOX, the
FCPA, Dodd-Frank, the securities litigation system, and other regulations mentioned in Sec-
tion I(C). Performing a cost-benefit analysis on the controversial provisions of existing laws
and regulations may provide a means for assessing the desirability of changing the existing
regulatory structure and for setting priorities for legislative action.”).
149. See Ronald D. Rotunda, What You Didn’t Know About Our Federal Income Tax,
VERDICT JUSTIA (June 2017), https://verdict.justia.com/2017/06/05/didnt-know-federal-
income-tax.
150. See H.C., The White House hints that tax reform could pay for the border wall, THE
ECONOMIST (Jan. 2017), http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2017/01/taxes-
and-tariffs.
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the BAT unnecessary, because  he believes lowering the U.S. corporate
rates would achieve the desired revenue goals.151
The April 26, 2017 tax policy statement by the White House did not
include a border adjustment component,152 and ultimately, the Trump ad-
ministration decided to remove the BAT from the final tax reform bill;153
however, given the numerous references to the BAT during the campaign,
an analysis of its viability and constitutionality is relevant.  Detractors of
the BAT suggest that any cost to importers would likely be extended to
consumers in the form of higher prices.154  Also, the BAT may hurt im-
porters with small “profit margins,” potentially resulting in layoffs in the
employment sector.155  The BAT, as a protectionist measure, may also
breach a fundamental notion of fairness156 and may have an adverse effect
on “locational neutrality.”157
BAT policies could also result in a strengthened U.S. dollar.  In this
light, Neil Irwin of the New York Times suggests a strengthened U.S. dol-
lar may cause the “trade balance” to result back to the level it was prior to
the tax reform.158  Irwin also states that an increase in the value of the
U.S. dollar could put negative pressure on emerging market banks and
other financial institutions that hold a large amount of U.S. denominated
bonds.159  The BAT also presents a new scenario for exploitation through
tax arbitrage, which Lawrence Summers predicts would “force burden-
some tax hikes or spending reductions on the federal government”160 and
would present a mischief to international trade.161
151. See Alan Reynolds, Cut the Corporate Tax Rate; Drop The BAT, CATO AT LIB-
ERTY (May 2017), https://www.cato.org/blog/cut-corporate-tax-rate-drop-bat.
152. Pramuk, supra note 2.
153. See Jacob Pramuk, Republicans scrap border adjustment from tax reform plan,
CNBC (July 27, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/27/top-republicans-behind-tax-plan-
say-border-adjustment-tax-is-dead.html.
154. See Phil Wahba, Walmart, Target and Other Retailers Are Teaming Up to Fight
Trump’s Border Tax, FORTUNE (Feb. 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/02/01/walmart-target-
border-tax-trump/.
155. See id.
156. See generally Leo P. Martinez, Tax Collection and Populist Rhetoric: Shifting the
Burden of Proof in Tax Cases, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 239, 276 (1988).
157. See generally Daniel Saviro, An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Tax-
ation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 895, 975-76 (1992).




160. See Summers, supra note 24.
161. See generally John H. Jackson, National Treatment Obligations and Non-Tariff Bar-
riers, 10 MICH. J. INT’L L. 207 (2012).
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B. Border Adjustments and the Apportionment Clause
There is a question, asked by Nathan J. Richman of Tax Analysts, as to
whether the BAT is unconstitutional as an “unapportioned direct tax not
covered by the 16th Amendment.”162  Under the U.S. Constitution, Con-
gress is authorized to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Ex-
cises”;163 however, this power is curtailed by the Apportionment
Clause,164 which states that any “direct tax” must be apportioned amongst
the states, according to their respective numbers.165  Theodore B. Olson,
the U.S. Solicitor General under President George W. Bush, suggested
this restriction was enacted to ensure that states with larger populations
would not collude to pass tax laws with a disproportionate effect on “less
populous states” (e.g. taxes based on land size).166  On the other hand,
Calvin Johnson states that the “apportionment of tax was brought into the
Constitution to impose a disincentive on slavery.”167
The apportionment requirement was later curtailed, in regards to the
collection of income taxes, when the states ratified the Sixteenth Amend-
ment168 to the Constitution.169  As such, Benjamin Rippeon, legal counsel
to Koch Industries Inc. and BAT opponent, in an interview with Nathan J.
Richman, suggests the issue of constitutionality can be distilled to two
questions: (1) Can the BAT safely be characterized as an “income tax
under the 16th amendment”?  (2) If it cannot, is the BAT an unconstitu-
162. Nathan J. Richman, Could a Court Find the Border Adjustment Unconstitutional?
TAX ANALYSTS (Apr. 2017), http://www.taxanalysts.org/content/could-court-find-border-ad
justment-unconstitutional.
163. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.1.
164. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl.3.
165. See generally Derek Devgun, International Fiscal Wars For The Twenty-First Cen-
tury: An Assessment of Tax-Based Trade Retaliation, 27 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 353, 403
(1996).
166. Theodore B. Olson, If Retail Politics Doesn’t Kill This $1 Trillion Tax, the Supreme
Court Should, WASH. POST (May 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/if-re
tail-politics-doesnt-kill-this-1-trillion-tax-the-supreme-court-should/2017/05/03/4a623b42-2f7
7-11e7-9dec-764dc781686f_story.html?utm_term=.c5a58e43509f.
167. Calvin H. Johnson, Fixing The Constitutional Absurdity of The Apportionment of
Direct Tax, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 295, 296 (2005).
168. See generally Angela P. Harris, Vultures In Eagles Clothing: Conspiracy and Radi-
cal Fantasy In Populist Legal Thought, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 269, 280 (2005) (“A host of
challenges are regularly asserted against the propriety of the Sixteenth Amendment, which
was ratified in 1913 and gave Congress the authority to impose income taxes without regard
to apportionment. To prove that the Sixteenth Amendment was never in fact ratified, it must
be shown that at least three states’ ratifications were improper and void. In their efforts to do
this, protesters have called attention to the existence of numerous procedural and clerical
errors in the ratification process in several states. The ratification process in Oklahoma was
particularly riddled with mistakes and lapses in procedural regularity, and so the argument
that Oklahoma’s ratification was improper is a favorite of protesters.”); see also Christopher
S. Jackson, The Inane Gospel of Tax Protest: Resist Rendering Unto Caesar – Whatever His
Demands, 32 GONZ. L. REV. 291, 301-07 (1996).
169. U.S. Const. amend. XVI.
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tional “direct tax” or a constitutional “indirect tax”?170  This Article will
now address these two questions.
C. Does BAT Qualify as an Income Tax Under
the Sixteenth Amendment?
One of the first individuals to publically question the constitutionality
of the BAT was Theodore B. Olson.171  Olson posited that the BAT was
not a tax on income (and thus not covered by the Sixteenth Amendment)
since businesses that “use imported materials or components” cannot de-
duct their full costs.  In other words, an “income tax” must be a tax on a
“gain” or “net increase”; therefore, calculating revenue without deducting
all the costs is not a “tax on income.”172  He further suggests that deduct-
ing costs of “materials or parts acquired abroad” from gross receipts is a
necessary component to the calculation of gross income.173  This principle
was identified in the case of Sullenger v. Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue,174 which dealt with the calculation of income for a meat distributing
company. Sullenger established that cost of goods sold must be subtracted
from gross receipts to determine gross income.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers Co. further supports the Sullenger
argument.175  In Doyle, a corporation in the lumber manufacturing busi-
ness was entitled, for the purpose of calculating its net income, to deduct
the value of cut stumpage.176
Erik Jensen provides support to the argument that Congress’ power to
define a tax as “income” is subject to “specific limitations.”177  This pro-
position refutes the conventional wisdom that Congress is not restricted by
“fine distinctions” in the definition of income178 and that Congress can
define what “income” means—potentially rendering the concept void of
any static meaning.179  Jensen notes that the phrase “taxes on incomes”
170. See Richman, supra note 162.
171. Olson, supra note 166.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Sullenger v. Commissioner, 11. T.C. 1076 (1948).
175. Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179 (1918).
176. Id.
177. See Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing Power, The Sixteenth Amendment, and the Mean-
ing of “Incomes,” 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057, 1064 (2001).
178. See generally Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Constitutional Meaning of Income and
the Income Taxation of Gifts, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1, 24 (1992).
179. See Daniel N. Shaviro, Psychic Income Revisited: Response to Professors Johnson
and Dodge, 45 TAX L. REV. 707, 711 n.17 (1990); see also Victor Thuronyi, The Concept of
Income, 46 TAX L. REV. 45, 54 (1990) (“[I]ncome could mean the same thing as consumption
or wealth, or something else, depending on the criteria we choose for determining tax
equity.”).
32 Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review [Vol. 7:1
has a meaning and that the definition should be determined “by the time-
honoured distinction between income taxes and consumption taxes.”180
A number of cases have dealt with the definition of income as it per-
tains to the Sixteenth Amendment.181  In opposition to Olson’s argument,
Bruce Fein,182 citing the case of Commissioner v. Sullivan,183 has pointed
out that deductions are a matter of “legislative grace” and that deductions
can be refused by Congress.  Specifically, Fein notes that such congres-
sional action has been done in the past with respect to deductions for ex-
penses incurred in trafficking controlled substances.184  Fein also notes
that the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) will disallow deductions for ex-
penses that are not, on their face, illegal.185  In support of his argument,
Fein cites the case of New Colonial Ice Co., Inc. v. Helvering,186 which
stands for the proposition that to deny a deduction is not the equivalent of
imposing a new tax because a new corporation can be taxed on gross
income.187
D. Is the BAT a Direct or Indirect Tax?
If the BAT is not a tax on income covered by the Sixteenth Amend-
ment, then the next question is whether it is a direct or indirect tax.  If it is
a direct tax, then it must be apportioned amongst the states.  The court has
wide discretion on constitutional determinations and, as noted by Calvin
Johnson, can “avoid apportionment by defining ‘income tax’ broadly
enough to cover the tax at issue or by defining ‘direct tax’ narrowly
enough to exclude the tax at issue.”188  Those in support of the BAT being
a direct tax argue that not accounting for the full cost of goods sold makes
the tax one on the value of the property, in contrast to an indirect tax,
which generally deals with matters such as “manufacture, sale . . . con-
sumption,” or doing business.189
180. Jensen, supra note 177, at 1062.
181. See Brushhaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1 (1916); Carver v. United States,
No. CIV. 82-74787, 1983 WL 386 (E.D. Mich. July 19, 1983).
182. Bruce Fein, Border Adjustment Debate Shouldn’t Be Distracted By Constitutional
Doubts, WASH. TIMES (May 10, 2017), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/may/10/
border-adjustment-and-constitution/.
183. See Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 28 (1958) (“Deductions are a matter of
grace, and Congress can, of course, disallow them as it chooses. At times, the policy to disal-
low expenses in connection with certain condemned activities is clear.”).
184. See Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (1970).
185. Fein, supra note 182.
186. New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435 (1934).
187. See id. at 440 (“The power to tax income like that of the new corporation is plain,
and extends to the gross income. Whether and to what extent deductions shall be allowed
depends upon legislative grace, and only as there is clear provision therefor can any particu-
lar deduction be allowed.”).
188. See Calvin H. Johnson, Apportionment of Direct Taxes: The Foul-up in the Core of
the Constitution, 7 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1, 3 (1998).
189. Richman, supra note 162.
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There is wide debate on both the historic origins and the definitional
breadth of the term “direct tax.”  While a direct tax is not defined in the
Constitution, Gale Ann Norton suggests that its definition originated with
Adam Smith190 and that there was ambiguity on its interpretation by the
Founding Fathers.191  Calvin Johnson, on the other hand, suggests that the
phrase “direct tax” in 1787 was synonymous for “apportioned tax”192 and
further argues that “taxes for which a uniform rate is required—duties,
excises, and imposts—cannot be direct taxes.”193  The U.S. Court of Ap-
peals, D.C. Circuit, has indicated that “[o]nly three taxes are definitely
known to be direct”—capitation, real property tax, and personal property
tax.194
The Apportionment Clause has also had a controversial effect on tax
law policy and constitutional litigation.195  Several constitutional chal-
lenges, alleging unapportioned, direct tax violations have been previously
undertaken.196  Recently such a challenge was sought (without success) in
the case of a compensatory damages award for emotional distress and loss
of reputation brought by an employee against a former employer.197  Ad-
ditional court challenges have also been brought on this topic in the areas
of executor liability198 and several other actions199 in relation to the con-
stitutionality of Obamacare.200
Bruce Ackerman has argued from original intention that the appor-
tionment requirement for direct taxes is a “constitutional anomaly”201
with “tainted origins”202 that relate to slavery.  Ackerman believes the ap-
portionment requirement should be narrowly construed and cannot serve
190. Gale Ann Norton, The Limitless Federal Taxing Power, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 591, 605 (1985).
191. See id. at 605. See also J.H. Riddle, The Supreme Court’s Theory of a Direct Tax, 15
MICH. L. REV. 566, 566 (1917) (“The authoritative opinion of those who have examined the
records is that there was no definite meaning agreed upon in the convention and that it was a
vague term.”).
192. Johnson, supra note 167, at 314.
193. Id.
194. See Murphy v. I.R.S., 493 F.3d 170, 181 (2007). See also Fernandez v. Wiener, 326
U.S. 340, 352 (1945); Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895). See
generally Johnson, supra note 167.
195. Johnson, supra note 167, at 296.
196. See Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 136 (1929); Spreckels Sugar Ref. Co. v.
McClain, 192 U.S. 397, 413 (1904).
197. Murphy, 493 F.3d at 171-73.
198. See Brief of Petitioner, Grandy v. Comm’r, No. 26157-10 (T.C. Feb. 24, 2012).
199. See Brief for Landmark Legal Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting Respon-
dents, Dep’t of Health and Human Services v. Fla., No.11-398 (U.S. Feb. 10, 2012) 2012 WL
484060.
200. See Brief for Landmark Legal Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants,
Liberty Univ. v. Geitner, No. 10-2347 (4th Cir. Mar. 6, 2013) 2013 WL 821216.
201. Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 23 (1999).
202. Id. at 4.
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as a constitutional barrier to tax reform.203  He suggests that the Founders
did not “have a very clear sense of what they were doing in carving out a
distinct category of ‘direct’ taxes for special treatment.”204  He further ar-
gues that with the exception of Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co.205
(which led to the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment), the Supreme
Court has consistently and explicitly engaged in “restrained interpretation
of the direct tax clauses” for nearly two centuries.206
Ackerman’s rejection of an expansive interpretation of direct taxation
would support the constitutionality of the BAT and would further create a
situation that is “politically absurd” without the apportionment require-
ment (in that it would require citizen of poorer states to pay higher tax
rates).207  Ackerman concludes that no taxes (not even a land tax) should
be considered direct based on the constitution and that “American law
should leave no stone unturned in its effort to root out any residue of its
original compromise with slavery—and the ‘direct tax’ clause is a small,
but potentially damaging, stone.”208
Erik Jensen refutes Ackerman’s original interpretation, stating that the
“idea that the founding generation was reconciled to an unlimited, or
nearly unlimited, taxing power is wishful thinking, a warping of historical
understanding.”209  Nonetheless, Jensen also acknowledges Congress’
ability to “do almost anything in the tax area.”210  Jensen posits that the
Constitution in its original form divided taxes into two categories: direct
(subject to the apportionment requirement) and indirect (generally con-
sumption taxes subject to the uniformity rule).211  He further argues, citing
The Federalist No. 21,212 that direct taxes have the apportionment rule
because, unlike consumption taxes, there are no “natural limitations on
their use.”213  Jensen, however, notes that direct taxes do extend beyond
just capitation and real estate taxes to capture all other taxes that are not
“indirect.”214  In this light, to understand “direct taxes” we must first grasp
what is captured by “indirect taxes.”  Jensen argues indirect taxes should
be understood as “duties and excises on articles of consumption.”215
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
206. Ackerman, supra note 201, at 6.
207. Id. at 2.
208. Id. at 58.
209. Erik M. Jensen, Taxation and the Constitution: How To Read The Direct Tax
Clauses, 15 J.L. & POL. 687, 689 (1999).
210. Id. at 692.
211. Id. at 694.
212. THE FEDERALIST NO. 21, at 106-11 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1999).
213. Jensen, supra note 209, at 694-98.
214. Id. at 698.
215. Id. at 701.
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James Campbell takes a somewhat different approach from Jensen, cit-
ing the case of Hylton v. United States216 (particularly the oral arguments
of Alexander Hamilton) that the Framers of the Constitution knew exactly
what they meant by the term “direct taxation” and that the term repre-
sented  “basically an apportioned property tax.”217  He refutes the argu-
ment that apportionment was a “vestigial trace of the Founders’ long-since
repudiated ‘bargain with slavery,’ ” but rather suggests that the apportion-
ing of direct taxation was a “rough attempt to proportion taxes to wealth
and the ‘ability to pay.’ ”218  Nevertheless, Campbell acknowledges that
the Framers deliberately narrowed the class of direct taxes and that “direct
taxes” were “near synonyms” for “internal taxes” (levied by the states).219
In reviewing the question of “indirect” versus “direct,” Campbell suggests
that the relevant questions for indirect taxes include: can the cost be
“shifted” to others?;220 is the tax burden one that can be avoided?; and is
it an expenditure?221
Robert Natelson has argued that the distinction between indirect and
direct taxation was “widely understood” by the Founders and that “direct
tax” was “more expansive than commonly realized.”222  Natelson, based
on his research of writings in the Founder’s era, provides the following
definition, “A tax was direct if it was imposed on people’s lives, homes, or
on the productive occupations by which they supported and expressed
themselves.  Direct taxes, in other words, were levies on living and produc-
ing.”223  Indirect taxes, on the other hand, include everything that was
“not direct,” or “duties imposed not principally for regulation but for the
raising of revenue.”224  Natelson further notes that the principal targets of
indirect taxation “were consumption (especially of luxuries), domestic and
foreign trade, and enumerated business and official transactions.”225
Daniel Hemel from the University of Chicago Law School has stated
that the BAT is a combination of an “impost” and an “excise” tax.  Fur-
thermore, he notes that Article 1, Section 8, Clause 1 of the Constitution
states that duties, imposts, and excises “do not have to be apportioned
216. Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796).
217. James R. Campbell, Dispelling the Fog about Direct Taxation, 1 BRIT. J. AM. LE-
GAL STUD. 109, 111 (2012).
218. Id. at 114.
219. Id. at 115.
220. Id. at 169.
221. Id.
222. Robert G. Natelson, What The Constitution Means by “Duties, Imposts, and Ex-
cises” and “Taxes” (Direct or Otherwise), 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 297 (2015).
223. Id. at 318.
224. Id.
225. Id.
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among the states.”226  He cites, in favor of his position, Flint v. Stone Tracy
Co.,227 where the Supreme Court held that a corporate tax did not require
apportionment.228 In any event, as noted by Bruce Fein, just because the
BAT denies deductions for importing goods, does not mean that it is a
direct tax.  In support, Fein cites National Federation of Independent Busi-
ness v. Sebelius, which suggests taxes levied for refusing to engage in a
transaction for the purchase of health insurance are not direct taxes.229
Another consideration in the direct-indirect analysis is the issue of con-
sumer shifting.  This issue has particular relevance in the BAT constitu-
tionality debate.  Jensen has suggested that it was the Founder’s intent for
indirect taxes to be taxes on imports or consumption articles that could be
“shifted” to consumers through price adjustment.230  Thus, with an indi-
rect tax, a consumer has a choice: decide to buy the product and pay the
tax, or not buy the product.  If the indirect tax is too high, then revenue
will decrease because of lower sales.231  Calvin Johnson has noted that
Professor Jensen’s interpretation of Founder intent has historical sup-
port.232  On the other hand, defining indirect taxes as “shiftable taxes” is
“contradicted by a far larger number of important usages,” including
James Madison’s assumption before the Virginia Ratification Convention
that direct taxes included shiftable taxes233 and John Jay’s use of specific
direct taxes on goods.234
IV. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN A BAT CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
A. Other Consitutional Considerations
It is uncommon for federal tax legislation to be struck on constitutional
grounds.235  It happened in 1919 by the U.S. Supreme Court in Eisner v.
226. Daniel Hemel, Border Tax May Be Bad Idea, But It’s Not Unconstitutional, THE
HILL (May 12, 2017, 9:00 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/economy-budget/3330
83-border-tax-may-be-bad-idea-but-its-not-unconstitutional.
227. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911).
228. Id. at 171 (“What we have said as to the character of the corporation tax as an
excise disposes of the contention that it is direct, and therefore requiring apportionment by
the Constitution.”).
229. Fein, supra note 182.
230. See Erik M. Jensen, In the Apportionment of Direct Taxes: Are Consumption Taxes
Constitutional?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2334, 2359 (1997).
231. Id. at 2337.
232. See Johnson, supra note 188, at 67-69.
233. Id. at 69.
234. Id.
235. See generally Stephen W. Mazza & Tracy A. Kaye, Restricting the Legislative
Power to Tax in the United States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 641, 641-42 (2006) [hereinafter Mazza
Kaye Restricting]. See also Tracy A. Kaye & Stephen W. Mazza, United States—National
Report: Constitutional Limitations on the Legislative Power to Tax in the United States, 15
MICH. ST. J. INT’L. L. 481 (2007).
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Macomber,236 which examined the question of whether Congress could
tax, as income and without apportionment, a lawfully issued stock divi-
dend (issued by the Standard Oil Company of California) under the Six-
teenth Amendment.  The Court found that the provision of the Revenue
Act237 in question was invalid238 because “neither under the Sixteenth
Amendment nor otherwise has Congress power to tax without apportion-
ment a true stock dividend made lawfully and in good faith, or the accu-
mulated profits behind it, as income of the stockholder.”239  The Court
held that the Amendment “must be construed in connection with the tax-
ing clauses of the original Constitution and the effect attributed to them
before the amendment was adopted.”240
The Court further reasoned that the Sixteenth Amendment did not ex-
tend Congress’ taxing power to “new subjects, but merely removed the
necessity which otherwise might exist for an apportionment among the
states of taxes laid on income.”241  As a result, it was essential to define
what is characterized as “income”—a matter which could not be done by
Congress alone due to its inability to alter the Constitution by legisla-
tion.242  Justice Brandeis, however, in his dissenting opinion, cautioned the
Court to declare an act of Congress invalid, except in a “clear case.”243
Another factor that supports the constitutionality of the BAT is what
Bruce Fein identifies as the U.S.’s propensity for “buy American” mea-
sures, such as Alexander Hamilton’s championing of high import duties in
his “Report on Manufacturers,” the Buy American Act of 1933,244 and the
ten percent surcharge President Nixon applied on “dutiable imports” to
favor American goods.245  Further, it has been identified by O’Hara and
Dougan that the Supreme Court has “fairly consistently” upheld taxes that
apply only to select industries while exempting other industries.246
236. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
237. Revenue Act of September 8, 1916, ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756.
238. See Scott A. Taylor, Corporate Integration in the Federal Income Tax: Lessons
From the Past and a Proposal for the Future, 10 VA. TAX REV. 237, 247 (1990).
239. See Eisner, 252 U.S. at 219.
240. Id. at 205.
241. Id. at 206.
242. Id. In order to amend the Constitution it would require a two-thirds vote in Con-
gress and the approval of seventy-five percent of the States.
243. Id. at 238.
244. Buy American Act of 1933, 41 U.S.C. §§ 8301–8305 (2012).
245. Fein, supra note 182.
246. Erin A. O’Hara & William R. Dougan, Redistribution Through Discriminatory
Taxes: A Contractarian Explanation of the Role of the Courts, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 869,
908 (1998). See also Lake Lanier Theatres v. Hall County, 189 S.E.2d 439 (Ga. 1972);
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S.
522, 526-27 (1959); United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953); United States v. Sanchez,
340 U.S. 42 (1950); Carmichael v. S. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937); Sonzinsky v.
United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937); A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934); United
States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919); Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U.S. 59, 62 (1912);
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Gale Ann Norton has suggested that Congress’ taxing power is nearly
“limitless”247 and that there is case law support for the proposition that a
tax “too high, oppressive, burdensome, restrictive or even destructive does
not provide a basis upon which the courts can void a tax invoked by Con-
gress.”248  As an example, Norton cites the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax
Act of 1980,249 which the Supreme Court found to be constitutional250 de-
spite its imposition of a large tax burden on oil producing companies in a
geographically “non-uniform” manner (Alaskan oil was exempted from
the tax).251  Norton further points out that courts have generally used a
different standard with respect to taxation matters (as opposed to other
acts of Congress) than with respect to due process,252 just compensa-
tion,253 and equal protection.254  Norton also indicates that there are pro-
cedural obstacles255 to tax constitutional challenges, including a strong
presumption in favor of the constitutionality of tax legislation.256
Other than the not apportioned between the states and not qualifying
as income direct tax arguments are there other potential constitutional an-
gles for a BAT challenge?  One potential argument is that of “horizontal
inequity”257 under the Uniformity Clause.258  This argument is based on
the manner in which the BAT discriminates against importing businesses.
Given the existence of precedent interpreting the Uniformity Clause as
concerning geography259 and given Congress’ wide discretion to draw dis-
tinctions between taxpayers, this horizontal inequity argument is unlikely
McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904); Gundling v. City of Chicago, 177 U.S. 183
(1900); Royall v. Virginia, 116 U.S.572 (1886); Ky. R.R. Tax Cases, 115 U.S. 321 (1885); Mc-
Millen v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 37 (1877).
247. See Norton, supra note 190, at 591.
248. See Ptasynski v. United States, 550 F. Supp. 549, 555 (D. Wyo. 1982), rev’d on other
grounds, 462 U.S. 74 (1983).
249. See Norton, supra note 190, at 592.
250. See United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74 (1983).
251. See Norton, supra note 190, at 593-95.
252. Id. at 608. See also Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 326 (1932) (“That a federal
statute passed under the taxing power may be so arbitrary and capricious as to cause it to fall
before the due process of law clause of the Fifth Amendment is settled.”).
253. See Norton, supra note 190, at 608. See also Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 143
(1938).
254. See Id.; see also City of Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369 (1974); A.
Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 44 (1934); Barclay & Co. v. Edwards, 267 U.S. 442
(1925); McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 57 (1904).
255. Norton, supra note 190, at 621-24.
256. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 547-48 (1983); Madden
v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1940); Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509, 514-15 (1899).
257. See Mazza Kaye Restricting, supra note 235, at 655-57.
258. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c1. See also Norton, supra note 190, at 597-99.
259. See Jeffrey S. Kinsler, Circuit-Specific Application of the Internal Revenue Code:
An Unconstitutional Tax, 81 DENV. U. L. REV. 113 (2003).
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to succeed.260  Furthermore, the argument is even less viable if all import-
ing companies were equally affected.261
Another angle would be to attack the unfair treatment that a few com-
panies are given under the BAT as a challenge under the Equal Protection
Clause.262  As pointed out by Stephen W. Mazza and Tracy A. Kaye, how-
ever, there are many examples in the Internal Revenue Code of “exclu-
sions, deductions, credits and tax rate deductions that favor certain
taxpayers, investment and business activities over others.”263  While there
are many theories as to why this reality exists,264 and despite the costs of
deferral,265 courts may consider this to be a question better suited for
Congress to answer.266  Lastly, given the BAT’s tendency to favor export-
ing companies by requiring importing companies to bear the costs of the
tax, a potential alternative argument based on the Taking Clause of the
Fifth Amendment may be available.267
In this Section, the Article has outlined the various reasons and consid-
erations why a constitutional challenge to the BAT is unlikely to succeed.
In the next Section, the Article will address the controversial issue of
judges using economic analysis when assessing the constitutionality of tax
reform and will address how such analysis could be applied in the case of a
BAT judicial review.
B. The Case for Economic Analysis on BAT Constitutionality
Given the U.S. Supreme Court’s reluctance to challenge Congress on
tax matters, overturning the BAT on constitutional grounds is a very chal-
lenging undertaking.  Another question arises: is it possible for the Courts
to use economic theory (particularly the irrelevant impact that the legisla-
tion may have in light of the MMT and the empirical studies previously
shown) to influence the question of BAT constitutionality under the Six-
teenth Amendment?  For example, if a BAT was ultimately neutral or ir-
260. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 547-48 (1983); United
States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74 (1983); Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340 (1945); Poe v.
Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930),); Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 24 (1916).
261. See Norton, supra note 190, at 601. See also Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 171 (1796).
262. See Mazza Kaye Restricting, supra note 235, at 668-71.
263. See Id. at 668.
264. See generally Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of
the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1
(1990).
265. See Yorio, supra note 140, at 23-24.
266. See Apache Bend Apartments, Ltd. v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1285 (N.D. Tex.
1988), rev’d 987 F.2d 1174, 1180 (5th Cir. 1993).
267. See Norton, supra note 190, at 621-24. See also Citizens’ Savings & Loan Ass’n v.
Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1874); Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449
U.S. 155, 163 (1980); Nashville, Chattanooga, & St. Louis Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405 (1935);
Myles Salt Co. v. Board of Comm’rs, 239 U.S. 478 (1916); Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340,
358 (1945).
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relevant in its impact on trade, but disproportionately affected certain
import heavy states or if a BAT negatively impacted domestic consumers
and drove import companies overseas, would the court supplement the
constitutional question with an application of economic cost-benefit analy-
sis, and if so, under what parameters?
Despite Judge Jerome Frank once famously noting that a case may turn
on what a judge “had eaten for breakfast,”268 factors such as political ide-
ology269 and economic analysis270 often influence constitutional questions.
In fact, there are numerous articles that have identified the role of eco-
nomic analysis in the judicial decision-making of U.S. Courts.271  For ex-
ample, Judge Richard Posner, arguably the leading figure in the law and
economics movement, advocated for seeing the entire constitution as an
“economic document.”272  Judge Posner incorporated this theory in a wide
array of his published opinions.  In this manner, he has consistently relied
on economic analysis (using both positive and normative arguments) in his
judicial decision-making.273
Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg has also outlined the role that economic
analysis has played in antitrust law in the U.S. Supreme Court.  Judge
Ginsburg points out that starting in the 1970s, the court recognized eco-
nomic analysis to promote “economic efficiency” and “consumer wel-
268. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 34-35 (1930).
269. See Frank B. Cross, The Ideology of Supreme Court Opinions and Citations, 97
IOWA L. REV. 693 (2012).
270. See Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
271. See Nancy Whitmore, Congress, The U.S. Supreme Court and Must-Carry Policy: A
Flawed Economic Analysis, 6 COMM. L. & POL’Y 175 (2001); See also John D. Echeverria,
The Track Record on Takings Legislation: Lessons from Democracy’s Laboratories, 28 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 439 (2009); James P. Karp, An Alternative to the United States Supreme Courts
Economic-Based Rationale in Takings Analysis, 2 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 253 (1991); Barton H.
Thompson Jr., The Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Takings & Incentives, 49 STAN.
L. REV. 305 (1997); Barton H. Thompson Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449 (1990);
Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdis-
ciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251 (1997); Arpan A. Sura, An End-Run Around The
Taking Clause? The Law and Economics of Bivens Actions for Property Rights Violations, 50
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1739 (2009). See also Charles W. Collier, The Use and Abuse of Hu-
manistic Theory in Law: Reexamining the Assumptions of Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship,
41 DUKE L.J. 191 (1991); Frank B. Cross, The Ideology of Supreme Court Opinions and
Citations, 97 IOWA L. REV. 693 (2012); Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84
TEX. L. REV. 257 (2005); Earl M. Maltz, The Prospects for a Rival Of Conservative Activism
in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 24 GA. L. REV. 629 (1990); Joel Marrero, The Efficiency of
Fairness: A Law and Economics Analysis of the Bakke-Grutter Diversity Rationale, 29 CHI-
CANA/O-LATINA/O L. REV. 69 (2010); Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary is a They, Not an It:
Interpretive Theory and The Fallacy of Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549 (2005).
272. See generally Posner Constitution, supra note 7.
273. See Larry L. Chubb, Economic Analysis In The Courts: Limits and Constraints, 64
IND. L.J. 769 (1989).
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fare.”274  He further notes that the Supreme Court’s opinions in this area
have relied, to an increasing measure, on the work of leading econo-
mists275 and that it is “not uncommon to see briefs on both sides of a case”
present economic arguments.276  He cites, as a contributing factor, the
work of Judge Robert Bork277 on the original intent of the Sherman
Act.278  Ginsburg argues that economic analysis has “promoted consis-
tency in antitrust jurisprudence,” and as a result, the Court has revisited
previous decisions that were based on a “shaky foundation.”279
Additionally, Judge Posner’s “public interest theory” and “interest
group theory,”280 identified by George M. Cohen, could provide a poten-
tial economic framework for analyzing the BAT.  Following Mr. Cohen’s
reasoning, public interest legislation (which promotes equity and effi-
ciency) should be interpreted to maximize public welfare,281 whereas leg-
islation that favors a specific group should be restricted to the lawmaker’s
intent.282  One could argue that if the BAT (on the basis of public interest
theory) has adverse consumer or trade effects that outweigh revenue pro-
duction, then its enactment should be challenged.  The difficulty lies in
interpreting which of the two categories most suitably fits the BAT (Pos-
ner himself advocates for interest group theory for ambiguous cases).283
This dichotomy further begs the question: how easy is it to determine
legislative intent?  Given this difficulty, Posner suggests interpreting the
Constitution to give broad powers to Congress.  This interpretation would
favor the constitutionality of the BAT as within Congress’ power.284
For example, Judge Posner has used economic analysis in a case involv-
ing the statutory interpretation of an investment tax credit recapture law
274. Douglas H. Ginsburg, Originalism and Economic Analysis: Two Case Studies of
Consistency and Coherence in Supreme Court Decision Making, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
217 (2010).
275. Id. at 222-23.
276. Id. at 222.
277. Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. &
ECON. 7 (1966).
278. See Douglas H. Ginsburg, An Introduction To Bork (1966), 2 COMPETITION POL’Y
INT’L 225 (Spring 2006).
279. Ginsburg, supra note 274, at 222.
280. See Posner Economics, supra note 6, at 265. See George M. Cohen, Posnerian Ju-
risprudence and Economic Analysis of Law: The View From The Bench, 133 U. PA. L. REV.
1117, 1128-29 (1985).
281. See Cohen, supra note 280, at 1128-29. See generally Richard Posner, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 16 (2d ed. 1977) at 409.
282. See also Cohen, supra note 280, at 1129. See also Richard Posner, Statutory Inter-
pretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 817 (1983).
283. See Cohen, supra note 280, at 1130. See also Posner Economics, supra note 6, at
279.
284. See Cohen, supra note 280, at 1130. See also Posner Economics supra note 6, at
285.
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where there was ambiguity with respect to the intent of Congress.285  In
this case, as pointed out by George M. Cohen, Posner arguably ignored his
interpretative framework (noted above) and, instead, relied on “textual”
and “policy” arguments.286  This decision was criticized in dissent by Judge
Dumbauld as “expansive”; alternatively, Dumbauld argued for the inter-
pretation of tax statutes from a “literal” perspective.287
Walter Hellerstein has shown that economic analysis was used in deal-
ing with taxation issues on a state business level288 in matters including
“state tax exportation”—the question of whether non-residents are af-
fected by a state tax requires an analysis of the tax’s impact on a “geo-
graphic basis.”289  Further, in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana,290
several coal companies (and out-of-state utility customers) unsuccessfully
used the theory of state tax exportation to challenge a Montana coal sever-
ance tax on the basis that it violated the Commerce Clause.291  As Heller-
stein notes, this case highlights the difficulty in using economic analysis on
constitutional questions.  Even with an analysis of “the relevant market,
the geographic mobility of the factors of production, and the elasticity of
demand for a taxed product,” the court must still address fairness and
benefits.292
Hellerstein also identifies the use of economic analysis in the question
of state taxation of federal contractors293 (in contravention of the
Supremacy Clause)294 and in state taxes on lessees of federal property.295
Notably, the Supreme Court also used economic analysis when addressing
the question of the right to a refund for unconstitutional taxes when it
“struck down an exemption for locally produced alcoholic beverages from
an excise tax on the wholesale sale of liquors” that gave advantages to
local business and thus “discriminated against interstate commerce.”296
285. See A.O. Smith Corp. v. United States, 619 F.2d 1220 (7th Cir. 1982).
286. See Cohen, supra note 280, at 1146.
287. See A.O. Smith Corp., 619 F.2d at 1220.
288. See Walter Hellerstein, Selected Issues in State Business Taxation, 39 VAND. L.
REV. 1033, 1041 (1986).
289. Id. at 1042-45. See also Brief for Appellants at 8, Commonwealth Edison Co. v.
Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981); Brief for Robert W. Edgar as Amici Curiae Supporting Ap-
pellees, at 2, Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana 453 U.S. at 609 (1981).
290. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
291. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3.
292. Hellerstein, supra note 288, at 1048.
293. Id. at 1049. See also Washington v. United States, 460 U.S. 536 (1983).
294. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2. See also Washington v. United States, 460 U.S. 536
(1983). See also Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 (1954); Alabama v. King &
Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941).
295. See United States v. City of Detroit 355 U.S. 466 (1958). See also United States v.
County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452 (1977).
296. Hellerstein, supra note 288, at 1053. See Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263
(1984).
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Another type of economic analysis applicable to a BAT challenge
would be on the basis of regional discrimination.  However, such discrimi-
nation would need to be proven (which would be difficult).  Judge Posner
has stated, “the Constitution has to make provision for preventing the fed-
eral system from degenerating into a loose confederation, riddled with ex-
ternalities”; nonetheless,297 it is uncertain at this point if the BAT would
present this problem.  Even Posner himself has stated that judges should
not use economics in all constitutional cases.298  There is a tension be-
tween the principles of stare decisis299 and economic analysis.300  For ex-
ample, O’Hara and Dougan note that discriminatory taxes will redistribute
wealth, but that wealth redistribution alone is not a basis for a tax to be
unconstitutional.301  The BAT would be a form of wealth transfer that op-
erates “regardless of initial endowments,”302 and while there is an argu-
ment that the “indirect transfer” nature of its operation is less efficient
than other redistribution methods,303 this seems to be a question of eco-
nomics rather than law.
C. The Case Against Economic Analysis on BAT Constitutionality
Laurence Tribe has argued strongly against judicial reasoning by way
of economic analysis.304  He argues that this form of reasoning is just an
“accountability-avoiding device”305 and that the courts should not “dis-
cern the values implicit in the text” of the Constitution306 because this
practice promotes adjudicating by politics rather than law.307  Jonathan
Macey has also noted that despite “massive attention” given to economic
analysis in the law, it has had little effect on the actual outcomes of cases.
Accordingly, Macey notes that “traditional common-law reasoning” is
more efficient and is not “appreciably different” from economic reason-
297. Posner Constitution, supra note 7, at 28.
298. Id. at 31.
299. See Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Economic Perspective: An Economic Analysis
of the Supreme Court’s Doctrine of Precedent, 78 N.C. L. REV. 643 (2000).
300. See Posner Constitution, supra note 7, at 36-37
301. See O’Hara & Dougan, supra note 246, at 869. See also discussion at 894, (“Ameri-
can courts have never categorically prohibited discriminatory taxes. Instead, the Supreme
Court has taken the position that legislatures can break individuals into classes for separate
tax treatment so long as the classification is ‘based upon some reasonable ground’ and is ‘not
a mere arbitrary selection.’ ”). See also Magoun v. Ill. Tr. & Sav. Bank, 170 U.S. 283, 294
(1898); Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Cty. Comm’n, 488 U.S. 336, 344 (1989); State Bd. of
Tax Comm’rs v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 537 (1931).
302. O’Hara & Dougan, supra note 246, at 887.
303. See id.
304. Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency,
98 HARV. L. REV. 592 (1985).
305. Id. at 620.
306. Id. at 619.
307. Id.
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ing.308  Further, it has been suggested by George M. Cohen that even
Judge Posner himself has applied economic reasoning “selectively and in-
completely,” more in line with his political leanings than as a “cautious
and conscientious application.”309
The use of economic analysis in judicial reasoning usually centers on
contractual disputes310 and the question of the efficient allocation of re-
sources: in tort cases (e.g. the famous Hand Formula),311 in antitrust law,
or in property rights.312  Alternatively, Macey notes that it is not as obvi-
ous in cases of criminal law.313  Similarly, Yorio states that economics is
infrequently applied in tax law analysis.314
A study by Larry L. Chubb on the first three hundred published opin-
ions by Judge Posner revealed that while in theory Judge Posner has ex-
plained almost all areas of law via economic theory, his opinions, up to the
point of the study, relied on economic analysis in only a small number of
cases.315  These cases primarily involved either common law cases, matters
involving economic market regulation, or questions of constitutional rights
and federalism.316  Further, Chubb notes that economic analysis was not
frequently used by Posner in tax law or public welfare cases.317
In contrast, a subsequent study on Judge Posner’s tax opinions, con-
ducted by Adam Chodorow, provides “a rich and substantial body of ma-
terial through which to study economic analysis as a tool available for
judges in deciding cases.”318  In the study, Chodorow states that Judge
Posner utilized four methods of economic analysis in his tax cases:
308. Jonathan R. Macey, The Pervasive Influence of Economic Analysis on Legal Deci-
sionmaking, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 107, 107 (1994).
309. Cohen, supra note 280, at 1117-18.
310. See Bach v. Long Island Jewish Hosp., 267 N.Y.S.2d 289 (Sup. Ct., Nassau County,
1966).
311. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
312. See Fountainbleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-five Twenty-five Inc., 114 So.2d 357 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
313. See Macey, supra note 308, at 110.
314. See Yorio, supra note 140.
315. See Chubb, supra note 273, at 791, (“The use of economic analysis occurred, on
average, in approximately eight percent of Posner’s first 300 opinions. The use of economic
explanation appeared in an average of 18 percent of his opinions. The use of economic prece-
dent was very rare, accounting for an average of three percent of Posner’s opinions. Finally,
the majority of Posner’s opinions used no economic analysis. The no economic analysis cate-
gory represents on average approximately seventy-one percent of Posner’s opinions. There-
fore, at the outset of this section, it can be concluded that Posner has used economic analysis
in less than ten percent of his opinions or at most between ten and twenty-six percent if the
economic explanation category is considered.”).
316. See id. at 792-94.
317. See id. at 792-93.
318. See Adam Chodorow, Economic Analysis in Judicial Decision Making – An As-
sessment Based on Judge Posner’s Tax Decisions, 25 VA. TAX REV. 67, 70 (2006).
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[T]he first is as a tool to draw inferences from evidence.  Second, he uses eco-
nomic analysis to help construe ambiguous statutes.  Third, he uses such anal-
ysis to help him determine whether a transaction has economic substance,
such that the Internal Revenue Service (“Service”) should respect the form of
the transaction.  Finally, Judge Posner has promoted the use of economics-
based tests as efficient, especially in comparison to more traditional multi-
factor tests, because it curtails judicial discretion, reduces uncertainty, and sig-
nals to potential litigants the likely outcome of any litigation.319
This gives support to the application of economic analysis to the BAT con-
stitutionality determination; however, one would need to first see the spe-
cific legislation in question for a complete analysis.
Macey argues that economic analysis is not really that helpful in cases
of “value judgment.”320  This argument is in line with Anthony D’Amato’s
position—in light of cases wrongly decided on the basis of economic anal-
ysis—that perhaps law and economics are not “descriptive” but rather
“normative.”  D’Amoto ponders that if this fact is the case, then what val-
ues support the analysis at all.321  Further, the lack of a “compelling nor-
mative justification” with respect to economic analysis causes this theory
to lead to greater uncertainty, making it less likely to be adopted by the
Court.322  Furthermore, one could argue that a protectionist tax policy like
the BAT is a value judgment on behalf of the government, and it is not the
role of the courts to make such a judgment.  It could also be as Laurence
Tribe aptly notes, “Treating a constitutional court’s task as merely one of
toting up marginal costs and benefits also ignores the crucial questions of
what counts as a cost or a benefit – and who gets to decide that issue?”323
Another problem that Macey points out when using law and economics is
that that judges would need to know a wide range of economic theories in
order to decide cases.324
CONCLUSION
There was an initial period of uncertainty as to what Trump’s tax re-
forms would look like when formal legislation was ultimately intro-
319. Id. at 70-71.
320. Macey, supra note 308, at 114.
321. Anthony D’Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1, 43-44. (1983).
322. Id. at 45.
323. Tribe, supra note 304, at 595.
324. Macey, supra note 308, at 116 (“By contrast, if judges attempted to decide cases
using economic analysis, they would have to familiarize themselves with an astonishing num-
ber of highly specialized disciplines in addition to basic microeconomics. These additional
specialties include econometrics, corporate finance, labor economics, industrial organization,
and public choice, to name a few.”).
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duced.325  This led to some frustration,326 and even questions of whether
the changes would take the form of “tax relief” or merely “tax reform.”327
Some even believed that Trump’s proposals were merely “rhetoric.”328
However, on December 20, 2017, despite a myriad of last minute changes
and partisan resistance, the Trump administration achieved what some
consider a “major victory” by obtaining Congressional approval on its $1.5
trillion tax reform bill.329  The final tax bill introduced significant changes
to the ways that businesses and corporations are taxed, including, among
other things, corporate rate cuts, deduction pass throughs, a repeal of the
AMT, establishing a corporate territorial system, implementing a “one-
time mandatory” repatriation tax, and changing the rules governing capital
expenses (allowing large capital investment expenses as immediate write
offs), interest deduction limits, carried interest, clean energy credits, and
anti-base erosion measures.330
This Article presented several economic theories, including the Modi-
gliani-Miller Irrelevance Theorem, and corresponding empirical evidence
to show how firms will adapt their policies and change their behaviors in
light of new tax measures.  It also showed how such observations could be
expected to materialize in the case of the tax reforms at issue; particularly,
the corporate rate cut changes, the changes to interest deductibility rules,
and the capital expense amortization and repatriation mechanisms.  As a
result, Trump’s tax reforms,331 while purporting to encourage positive
growth for the economy and enhancing business transactions,332 may in
fact lead to unintended or irrelevant consequences.
Ultimately, the border adjustment component of Trump’s initial tax re-
form proposal was left out of the final tax reform bill.  Nevertheless, if this
policy were to be revived in the future there is a question of whether it
325. Howard Gleckman, Trump May Have Killed The House GOP’s Business Tax Re-
form, FORBES (Jan. 17, 2017), http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2017/01/17/trump-may-
have-killed-the-house-gops-business-tax-reform/#2d3cf40b66c2.
326. Jake Novak, Impatience over Trump Tax Cuts is Growing, CNBC (Feb. 2, 2017),
http://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/02/mr-president-where-are-the-tax-cuts.html.
327. Howard Gleckman, Bye-Bye, Tax Reform; Hello, Tax Relief, FORBES (Jan. 25,
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would be constitutionally valid.  Overturning the BAT on constitutional
grounds, however, would face a significant uphill battle and would be un-
likely since Congress has wide latitude in authorizing new tax policies and
successful constitutional challenges are rare in the tax arena.  A successful
challenge would require proving that the BAT is not a “tax on income”
and that it is an unconstitutional “direct tax” unapportioned among the
several states.  Both aspects face significant opposition in terms of aca-
demic thought, constitutional interpretation of Framer’s intent, and case
law.  Similarly, history does not favor a successful challenge to the BAT
given Congress’ past actions: limiting deductions, instituting protectionist
measures, and enacting discriminatory tax laws; these actions were not
overturned by the court.
The Article also addressed the issue of whether economic analysis
could be used in assessing the constitutionality of certain tax reform (such
as the BAT).  The use of economics in judicial analysis is controversial and
is not widespread in matters dealing with value judgments (which arguably
includes tax policy). There is also not a discernible heuristic from case law
to govern when economic analysis should be applied in a given case.
Courts, in matters of tax litigation, have nonetheless used economic analy-
sis in the past—particularly Judge Posner.  A potential application of eco-
nomic analysis on tax reform measures is through a “public interest
theory”333 (the adverse impact on consumers from the reform offsetting
the potential revenue gains) or through a notable negative impact the re-
form may have on a particular region.  Both applications, however, require
significant data, which is potentially difficult to obtain, in order to prove
their viability.
333. See Posner Economics, supra note 6, at 265.
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